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CIVIL ENFORCEMENT OF JEWISH MARRIAGE AND
DIVORCE: CONSTITUTIONAL ACCOMMODATION
OF A RELIGIOUS MANDATE
INTRODUCTION
When a Jewish couple marries, both parties sign an ornate docu-
ment known as a ketubah. In layman's terms, the ketubah is the Jew-
ish marriage license.' The majority of rabbis officiating a wedding will
require the signing of a ketubah as part of the wedding ceremony. 2
Legal and Jewish scholars have interpreted the ketubah as a legally
binding contract which sets out the guidelines for a Jewish marriage
and divorce.3 Using this interpretation, a number of courts have re-
quired that one party accommodate the other in following the speci-
fied divorce proceedings that are mandated by Jewish law.4 The
Jewish law requirements for a valid divorce are strict and often diffi-
cult to enforce; namely, the law requires that a husband "voluntarily"
give his wife a document called a get in order to dissolve the marriage
according to traditional Jewish law.5
While the civil marriage contract alone binds the marriage in the
eyes of the state, courts nonetheless have found the ketubah to be
binding as well, and they have enforced both express and implied pro-
visions of the ketubah in granting a civil dissolution of a marriage be-
tween a Jewish couple. This includes the requirement that a get be
given.
This Comment opens with a discussion of the historical origins and
religious significance of the ketubah and the get. Noting that enforce-
ment of these two Jewish documents raises constitutional issues, this
Comment will then provide a brief review of the First Amendment to
1. See infra notes 10-27 and accompanying text (explaining that the ketubah is signed by the
couple immediately before the wedding ceremony and that the ketubah sets forth the obligations
of a husband towards his wife).
2. However, in order for their marriage to be civilly binding, couples must also sign a civil
marriage license, as required by the state in which they are married. See, e.g., CAL. FAM. CODE
§§ 422-23, 307 (West 1994) (setting out the procedures for signing a civil marriage license, which
is required whether or not the wedding is officiated by a clergyman).
3. See infra notes 140-42, 286 and accompanying text (noting the view that the ketubah is
equivalent to a civil contract spelling out the obligations of the parties during the marriage).
4. See infra notes 177-180, 196-212 and accompanying text (noting cases which have upheld
the get procedure based upon contract theory).
5. See infra notes 28-70 and accompanying text (discussing the get generally).
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the United States Constitution and its accompanying doctrine. The
discussion will show that it is constitutionally "kosher" for a civil court
to order one party to grant the other a Jewish divorce since it does not
violate the First Amendment.
In reaching its conclusion, this Comment uses the guidelines set
forth in two landmark Supreme Court rulings. Specifically, this Com-
ment purports that a court order enforcing the get procedure for mari-
tal dissolution does not violate the Establishment Clause since the
order effectuates a number of secular goals, does not advance Juda-
ism, and does not excessively entangle the civil court with religious
dispute or doctrine. In addition, not only does the order accommo-
date one party's free exercise of religion, but the other party is essen-
tially precluded from asserting a genuine free exercise claim since
Jewish authority contends that the specific act of giving or receiving a
get is not religious in nature.6 However, even if one's right to the free
exercise of religion is burdened, compelling state interests may over-
ride any possible First Amendment challenge. 7 This Comment dis-
cusses the right to contract, the right to remarry, and the right to equal
protection of the law, and the role that each may play as a compelling
state interest.
Next, this Comment examines a number of courts' reasoning and
techniques underlying orders which have enforced the get proceeding.
In doing so, this Comment pays special attention to a recent Illinois
case, In re Marriage of Goldman,8 which not only currently governs
this area of the law in Illinois, but is in line with court orders of a
number of other jurisdictions as well.9
Noting that numerous courts have upheld the get requirement
under general contract theory, this Comment nevertheless determines
that the ketubah document should not be enforced as a civilly binding
contract under the guise of a compelling state interest. Rather, this
Comment contends that the ketubah is an ornamental and highly sen-
timental document with terms and obligations which lack validity in a
modern and secular society. Moreover, the get requirement itself is
not found in the original ketubah at all, but rather, has its origin in the
Torah.
6. See infra notes 259.61 and accompanying text (referring to the view of many Jewish and
legal scholars that the get procedure is secular in nature).
7. See infra notes 292-98 and accompanying text (discussing the compelling state interests,
provided by the Fourteenth Amendment, that may overcome a Free Exercise claim).
8. 554 N.E.2d 1016 (III. App. Ct. 1990).
9. See infra notes 176-80 and accompanying text (discussing the get cases).
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Notwithstanding its invalidity as a contract, this Comment con-
cludes that a court may enforce the get procedure. The Fourteenth
Amendment provides the two compelling state interests for enforcing
the get procedure: the equal protection of the law and the fundamen-
tal right to remarry.
I. BACKGROUND
A. The Ketubah
Under Jewish law, marriage is an oral, not written, contract which is
effectuated by a religious ceremony.' 0 Immediately before the cere-
mony, the bride and groom sign a document known as a ketubah
("writing")." The ketubah is usually written in Aramaic or Hebrew
and may or may not be translated into English. 12 Although the
ketubah is publicly read at the wedding ceremony, most of the audi-
ence, including the couple being married, generally do not understand
what they are hearing since the ketubah is usually left untranslated.' 3
The ketubah is a standard document, traditionally signed by two
witnesses; thereafter, it is presented to the wife remaining her prop-
erty.14 The reason that the written document belongs exclusively to
the wife, rather than the couple, is that its purpose was to discourage
the husband from exercising what was his unilateral and unconditional
power to divorce his wife.' 5 In order to protect women from being
randomly dismissed, the authorities insisted on a formal marriage con-
tract, the ketubah, in which the husband agrees to pay a predeter-
mined sum of money to his wife in the event of a divorce.16 The
authorities hoped that by making divorce costly, the ketubah would
promote marital stability.' 7 Thus, the development of the institution
of marriage in Jewish law has been said to be related directly to the
10. IRWIN H. HAuT, DIVORCE IN JEWISH LAW AND LIFE 3-4 (1983); Marc Feldman, Jewish
Women and Secular Courts: Helping A Jewish Woman Obtain A Get, 5 BERKELEY WOMEN'S
L.J. 139, 141 (1990).
11. Feldman, supra note 10, at 141.
12. Id. Aramaic is a language similar to Hebrew in that it uses Hebrew script. Id. at 141 n.14.
Aramaic was the Jewish vernacular in the time of the Talmud (the Jewish legal compilation),
circa 500 C.E. Id. at 142 n.14. For a more intricate discussion of the Talmud, see infra note 35.
13. IRVING A. BRErroWrrz, BETWEEN CIVIL AND RELIGIOUS LAW: THE PLiGHT OF THE
AoUNAH IN AMERICAN SocIETY 283 (1993).
14. Id.
15. Solomon Zeitlin, The Origin of the Ketubah: A Study in the Institution of Marriage, 24
JEWISH Q. REV. 1, 4-6 (1933-34); see also BRErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 283,287 (noting that the
ketubah's "original purpose" was to give financial security to widowed or divorced women by
placing a lien on the husband's property).
16. BREITWrrz, supra note 13, at 287.
17. Id.
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"continuous advancement in the status, freedom and dignity of
women.'
8
The ketubah does not in itself effectuate the marriage. 19 Rather, it
sets out the obligations of a husband toward his wife.20 In the
ketubah, the husband agrees to provide such essentials as food, cloth-
ing, and sexual intercourse for his wife.21 The ketubah also provides
the amount of money the husband, or his estate, must pay his wife not
only upon divorce but also upon his death.22 However, the husband,
in return, is entitled to use the property that his wife brings into the
marriage, to use her earnings during the marriage, and to be an heir of
her estate should she die before him.23
The text of the ketubah has remained unchanged in all important
aspects since the Middle Ages.24 The most significant alteration oc-
18. GEORGE HOROwrrz, THE SPIRIT OF JEWISH LAW 253 (1953).
19. Linda S. Kahan, Note, Jewish Divorce and Secular Courts: The Promise of Avitzur, 73
GEO. L.J. 193, 197 (1984).
20. Id.
21. Feldman, supra note 10, at 141.
22. Id. Since the husband's monetary obligations set forth in the ketubah document are guar-
anteed by the husband's property, the ketubah essentially creates a lien on his estate. Id. (citing
HAUT, supra note 10, at 9).
23. HAUT, supra note 10, at 6.
24. Feldman, supra note 10, at 141. The translation of a standard Orthodox ketub2h is as
follows:
On the - day of the week, the day of the month of
in the year - since the creation of the world according to the manner of
reckoning here in the _ , the groom - the son of - said to the
virgin daughter of _ :
Be thou my wife in accordance with the law of Moses and Israel and I will work,
honor, support, and maintain thee in accordance with the practices of Jewish husbands
who work, honor, support, and maintain their wives in faithfulness. And I will give
thee 200 zuz as alimony for thy virginity which is due to thee under the law of the
Torah as well as food, clothing, needs, and cohabitation according to the way of the
world.
This virgin daughter of - consented and became his wife. The
dowry that she brought from her father's home in silver, gold, ornaments, clothing,
household furnishings, and her clothes amounting in all to the value of _, the
groom has taken upon himself. The groom has also consented to match the above sum
by adding the sum of making a total in all of _. Thus, did the
groom son of declare:
I hereby accept upon myself and my heirs the responsibility of this ketubah docu-
ment, the dowry, and the addition, that it shall be paid from all my property and posses-
sions, wherever located, that I now possess or that I will acquire in the future. All my
property, even the shirt on my shoulders, shall be security for and subject to this
ketubah document, this dowry, and the addition in my lifetime and after my death,
forever more. The responsibility of this ketubah document, the dowry, and the addi-
tion did the groom take upon himself with the full force and effect of all ketubah docu-
ments and their additions as is customarily practiced for the benefit of Jewish women
and in accordance with the enactments of the Sages (may their memory be a blessing)
not as a void penalty not as a mere form. And this groom has received in our presence
1996] JEWISH MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 497
curred in 1954, when the Conservative branch of American Judaism2 5
added a clause to the ketubah.26 While the Conservative movement
has slightly modified the text of the Orthodox ketubah, the Reform
movement does not use a ketubah at all unless the couple so desires. 27
B. The Get Proceeding
As the ketubah was intended to protect the wife in marriage, an-
other device, the get, was instituted to protect the wife in securing a
divorce. Orthodox and Conservative Judaism impose strict require-
ments on a couple's ability to divorce beyond those imposed by the
state.28 The parties must go through a divorce ceremony in accord-
ance with Jewish law, in addition to obtaining a civil divorce.29 A
good and valuable consideration to bind himself in accordance with all that is stated
above and all is binding and irrevocable.
The words of
The words of
BRErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 283-85.
25. There are three main branches of American Judaism: Orthodox, Conservative, and Re-
form. Orthodox is the most observant of traditional Jewish law and Reform is the least obser-
vant. Feldman, supra note 10, at 140 n.5. The problems discussed in this Comment are relevant
only to Orthodox and Conservative Jews, since only those two branches, with some differences,
recognize Jewish law as binding. The Reform Movement, on the other hand, abolished the re-
quirement of a get in 1869. J. David Bleich, Jewish Divorce: Judicial Misconceptions and Possi-
ble Means of Civil Enforcement, 16 CONN. L. REV. 201. 232 n.96 (1984).
26. BRErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 285. The additional clause that was approved by the
Rabbinical Assembly in 1954 for the Conservative ketubah is as follows:
We, the bride and groom . . . hereby agree to recognize the bait or [ Din of the
Rabbinical Assembly and the Jewish Theological Seminary of America or its duly ap-
pointed representatives as having authority to counsel us in the light of Jewish tradition
which requires husband and wife to give each other complete love and devotion, and to
summon either party at the request of the other, in order to enable the party so re-
questing to live in accordance with the standards of the Jewish law of marriage through-
out his or her lifetime. We authorize the Bait or [ I Din to impose such terms of
compensation as it may see fit for failure to respond to its summons or to carry out its
decision.
Id. at 285-86.
27. Id. at 283; HAUT, supra note 10, at 64. The Orthodox movement has rejected the Con-
servative addition based on its strict interpretation of Jewish law. See MOSHE MEISEtuAN, JEW-
ISH WOMAN IN JEWISH LAW 109-110 (Ktav Publishing House, Inc. 1978) (stating that Orthodox
scholars rejected the 1954 proposal principally because its compensation provision was indeter-
minate and in contradiction to Jewish law, which requires that the parties specifically know their
obligations under a contract).
28. See Irving Breitowitz, The Plight of the Agunah: A Study in Halacha, Contract, and the
First Amendment, 51 MD. L. REV. 312, 313-21 (1992) (discussing the origin and procedural re-
quirements of a get). See infra notes 32-70 (elaborating on the origin and procedural require-
ments of a get).
29. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 313. The religious ritual must be carried out in order for the
parties' subsequent marriages to be recognized in the Jewish faith. Id. See infra note 63 (discuss-
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halachically30 valid marriage may only be terminated through the
death of a spouse or by the granting of a get.3 1
1. History of the Get
Historical analysis sheds light on the modem-day requirement of
the get. In Biblical times, unlike today, there was little concern albout
the recalcitrant husband, who refused to grant his wife a divorce in
order to use his "get power" as leverage over her.32 Rather, the con-
cern was over prolonged and unexplained periods of absence, usually
due to war.33 Since "Jewish law does not require a presumption of
death arising from prolonged absence," a wife would only be permit-
ted to remarry after her husband's death could be clearly
established.3
According to the Talmud,35 King David required all fighting
soldiers to write gittin36 and give them to their wives.37 This was re-
quired to allow a wife to remarry if her husband did not return home
ing religious officials' refusal to marry couples without the parties having fulfilled the get
requirement).
30. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 318 n.17. Halacha is the whole body of Jewish law. Judaism
is not a religion concerned solely with prayer and rituals, but rather contains "a complete body
of substantive and procedural law that regulates every aspect of human conduct and interac-
tion." Id.
31. Id. at 319 (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, kiddushin 2a) (noting that Jewish law does not
recognize civil divorces when the get requirement has not been met; thus, subsequent remarriage
is considered "adulterous"). "Get is an Aramaic term meaning document." Id.
32. See id at 316 (discussing long and unexplained absences, usually due to war, as the origi-
nal purpose of giving a get). See infra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the possible
reasons for a husband's withholding of a get and explaining the notion of "get power").
33. Breitowitz. supra note 28, at 316-317.
34. Id.
35. Because of the intricacies of Jewish law, an overview of its basic structures is necessary in
order to understand the sources in this Comment. The chief source of authority on Jewish law is
the Torah, which is the first five books of the Old Testament. Id. at 314 n.4. This serves as a
"detailed legal code" of both civil and religious matters. Id. Supplementing this written legal
text, there arose an oral tradition which interpreted the text and constantly applied it to more
modern situations. Id. After the passing of many centuries, this oral tradition was "coramitted
to writing," becoming part of what is known as the Talmud. Id. "The Talmud is the authoritative
and definitive source of Jewish law and practice[, and remains so] to this day." Id. Out of the
Talmud came a form of literature known as rabbinic law. Id. Rabbinic law is the written re-
sponses of prominent rabbis to questions of how to apply the existing principles of Jewish law to
modern situations, which were most probably unanticipated by the ancient scholars. Id. These
responses from all over the world have been collected over the millennia, and have becore what
is now a great collection of volumes which cover every conceivable facet of Jewish law. id. This
written dialogue continues even today. Id.
36, The plural of get. Id. at 317 n.11; Feldman, supra note 10, at 142.
37. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 317 (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, shabbat at 56a; ketuboth at
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from war.38 If, however, the soldier returned safely, the couple would
be able to remarry each other.39 Needless to say, this procedure cre-
ated new and complicated problems, such as the unfortunate risk that
a soldier's wife would remarry another man before the soldier re-
turned home, since nothing compelled the wife to await her husband's
return. Jewish authorities considered the risk justified since the
wife's anguish from waiting "in limbo" indefinitely would be
avoided.41
2. Modem Application of the Get Requirement
At the divorce ritual, the husband, or a designated agent, must
physically hand to the wife, or her designated agent, the written docu-
ment of the get.4 2 Traditionally, the get is given in the presence of two
witnesses.43 While the get is Biblically mandated,"4 it has been as-
serted that the get procedure is not religious in nature.45 The execu-
tion of a get is essentially a private act since "it does not require the
participation of, or even the consent of, a rabbinical tribunal. '46 How-
ever, due to the formalities surrounding the actual writing of the get, a
rabbinical court of at least three is usually present to supervise.4 7 It
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. at 320-21. Unlike the ketubah, the entire get document must be handwritten for the
particular divorce for which it is being used. BRErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 6. Like the ketubah,
the get is written in Aramaic and Hebrew. Id. at 6, 283.
43. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 320-21.
44. See Lawrence C. Marshall, Comment, The Religion Clauses and Compelled Religious Di-
vorces: A Study in Marital and Constitutional Separations, 80 Nw. U. L. REv. 204, 208 n.26
(1985) (stating that the requirement of a get is originally found in Chapter 24:104 of the Book of
Deuteronomy of the Old Testament). Deuteronomy 24:104 provides that
when a man takes a wife and marries her then it comes to pass, if she finds no favor in
his eyes, because he has found some unseemly thing in her, that he writes her a bill of
divorce, and gives it in her hand, and sends her out of his house ....
Id.
45. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1020 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990) (relying on
expert testimony that, according to Jewish law, marriage and divorce are secular, contractual
undertakings which do not require the presence of a clergyman for validation); Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. 1981) (holding that the get requirement is not a reli-
gious act and that an order to compel its obtainment would not violate the First Amendment,
after its review of supporting expert testimony by Jewish clergymen). Similarly, Professor J.
David Bleich argues that the get is not at all a religious act since "it involves no worship and it
does not invoke the deity, a profession of creed, or confession of faith." Bleich, supra note 25, at
202. See also infra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing the two components of Jew-
ish law).
46. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 320.
47. Id.
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must be noted that the rabbis' role is only supervisory; they do not
effectuate the divorce since a husband is the only person who may
divorce his wife.4s The basic ceremony is quite simple and can usually
be accomplished in less than an hour.49
Notwithstanding developments to protect the woman in marriage
and divorce, the actual power to effectuate a divorce remains exclu-
sively with the husband, or his agent.50 In order for the procedu:re to
be accomplished, the husband must physically place the bill of di-
vorce, the get, into his wife's hands.51 Thus, according to Jewish law, it
is actually the husband who divorces his wife, as opposed to civil law,
which requires the state to dissolve the marriage.5 2
While a wife may be coerced into receiving or accepting a get, a
husband may be divorced only pursuant to "his free will."5 3 Although
the husband must willingly grant the divorce, under very limited cir-
cumstances the Jewish court, the beth din (or bait din),54 may impose
penalties on the husband if he refuses to freely comply with the di-
vorce proceeding.55 The coercive tactics used could range from fines
or community ostracism to corporal punishment.5 6 However, com-
mentators have made special note of the fact that if the husband is
willing to suffer those penalties, the beth din is powerless to order the
divorce since the get ultimately must be authorized exclusively by the
husband.5 7 Thus, if the husband's "consent" cannot be obtained even
48. Id. See infra notes 50-62 and accompanying text (discussing the source of a husband's
unilateral power to divorce his wife and idea of "coerced consent").
49. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 320.
50. HoRowrrz, supra note 18, at 273-75.
51. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 319.
52. Id. at 320.
53. BREITowrrz, supra note 13, at 320 (citing BABYLONIAN TALMUD, Yebamoth 112b;
Rambam, MISHNA TORAH, Ishut) (some citations omitted). In addition, if a husband produces a
get out of compulsion, it is invalid for the reason that it was not a product of his free will. Id.
54. Beth Din is Hebrew for "House of Law," or the rabbinic tribunal, normally comprised of
three rabbis. Id. at 14. While Biblical and Talmudic law gives extensive enforcement powers to
the beth din, today in the United States it does not possess such authority. Id. Rather, the
development of the separation of church and state in this country has created a situation where
the beth din no longer has coercive power and "can decide only those disputes that the parties
have voluntarily submitted to its jurisdiction." Id.
55. See Kahan, supra note 19, at 200-01 (explaining that under the legal fiction of "construc-
tive consent" the Jewish court may apply coercive tactics in certain limited instances where the
wife is recognized as having a right to divorce).
56. Id.; see also 4 ENCYCLOPEDIA JUDAICA, Beth Din and Judges 719-27 (1973) (discussing the
history, composition and jurisdiction of Jewish courts generally); MEISELMAN, supra note 27, at
101.
57. See MENACHEM ELON, THE PRINCIPLES OF JEWISH LAW 414-19 (1975) (noting that courts
can only compel "constructive consent" when there is a basis for either party to assert hisi or her
right to divorce (e.g., either is incapable of parenting a child or leads the other into "trans-
gressing the law of Moses"); otherwise the compulsion is perceived as duress and the "consent"
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with the application of coercive sanctions, the beth din has no power
to terminate the marriage.58
Aside from the requirement that only a husband has the power to
divorce his wife, another crucial limitation on the civil court's power
to compel a religious divorce is that only a beth din may apply coer-
cive tactics.5 9 The reason for this is contained in classical written com-
mentary of Jewish law.60 Therefore, if a civil court forces a husband to
give a get, the divorce is presumptively invalid under Jewish law.61
Although a civil court may not itself execute a get, it may compel a
husband to obey an order of the beth din once the beth din has de-
cided that the divorce may be granted under Jewish law.62
If either party refuses to participate in the Jewish divorce ceremony,
then the other party is prohibited from remarrying within the Jewish
is nullified); HAUT, supra note 10, at 19-20, 85-86 (noting that courts ultimately have no power
to enforce consent to giving a get since marriage and divorce in Jewish law are both personal acts
between a man and woman).
58. BREITOWTZ, supra note 13, at 40.
59. Feldman, supra note 10, at 143. "When Jewish communities were self-contained and self-
governing, as they were in the time of the Talmud," coercive tactics by the beth din could be
quite successful. Id. at 144. However, today in the United States, since all Jews live under secu-
lar law, the beth din has no civil enforcement powers outside moral and social pressures. Id.
Moral persuasion, however, is only effective where the man is sensitive to traditional Jewish
values since the beth din cannot force a man to appear before it any more than it can inflict
punishment. Id.; Kahan, supra note 19, at 201. In Israel, rabbinic courts can impose fines and
order a man to be placed in jail for refusing to deliver a get since the entire area of marriage and
divorce in that country is still governed exclusively by Orthodox Jewish law. HAUT, supra note
10, at 85-86; MEISELMAN, supra note 27, at 101.
60. The seemingly contradictory solution of coercing a husband to give his wife a get when it
must only be given of his own free will has been explained by the ancient sage Rambam who
stated as follows:
It is assumed that every Jew truly desires to comply with the dictates of religious law
and any refusal to do so is merely the result of an "evil disposition" which temporarily
overpowers or vanquishes his "free will." Duress is therefore applied no to overcome
the husband's exercise of will but to remove the impediment that prevents that "free
will" from emerging.
BRarrowrrz, supra note 13, at 34-35.
61. HATrr, supra note 10, at 24.
62. See id. (asserting that while a secular court's direct order would be tantamount to duress, a
civil court may generally enforce a Jewish court's doctrine, despite "some minority opinion to
the contrary"); MEISELMAN, supra note 27, at 100 ("[A] woman may not initially approach a
non-Jewish court to force her husband to grant her a Jewish divorce. However, if a beth-din
orders a Jewish divorce and the non-Jewish court merely enforces the decision of the beth-din,
the divorce is valid."); Kahan, supra note 19, at 210, 215 (stating that a secular court may enforce
the decision of a rabbinic court that a husband is required to give a get). As will become appar-
ent later in this Comment, civil courts today may now compel a husband to appear before a beth
din for the purpose of determining whether or not the marriage may be terminated under Jewish
law as a condition of the civil dissolution. See infra notes 182-89 and accompanying text (discuss-
ing Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E. 2d 136 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983), the first
case to hold that civil courts may compel a couple to appear before a beth din).
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faith.63 For a number of reasons the "victimized" spouse is most often
the wife.64 A woman whose husband leaves her and refuses to grant a
get is known as an agunah, meaning "bound woman. ' 65 Courts have
recognized that the husband's get power to bind his wife to the mar-
riage "gives him enormous leverage over the wife in seeking favorable
custody and/or property settlements."66
A civil divorce is not valid under religious law, just as a religious
divorce is not civilly recognized.67 Unlike marriage, where "almost all
states now recognize the legitimacy of a ceremony officiated by an
authorized minister of the faith of the parties," the power to divorce is
exclusively that of the secular judiciary.68 Thus, the get requirement is
completely separate from the granting or withholding of a civil marital
dissolution.69 Nevertheless, it is clear that the get is essential to the
divorce of a traditional Jewish adherent.70
63. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 313. Under most circumstances, Orthodox and Conservative
rabbis will not officiate the marriage of a divorced person where a properly executed get has not
been obtained from a recognized beth din dissolving the previous marriage. HoRowrrz, supra
note 18, at 281.
64. See Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 313 ("[T]he consent principle of Jewish divorce law is not
applied equally" since, if a husband refuses to consent to the divorce the wife is bound to the
marriage and may not remarry.); Kahan, supra note 19, at 200 ("The remarriage of a Jewish
woman without a get entails the most serious consequences: her remarriage will be considered
an act of adultry, and children of such a union ... will suffer religious disabilities including a
prohibition against marriage to other Jews."). However, if the wife refuses to accept a get when
her husband has proper grounds to divorce her, he is permitted to remarry. HAUT, supra note
10, at 56; Kahan, supra note 19, at 199. See infra notes 71-83 and accompanying text (discussing
the different consequences for men and women when remarrying without having obtained a get).
65. Feldman, supra note 10, at 139. The term aguna is derived from the term agun, or anchor,
and refers to women who are literally "chained" to their former spouses. BREITrrOWITz, supra
note 13, at 1 n.1.
66. Feldman, supra note 10, at 139. A few of the reasons for a husband's refusal to grant a get
are spite, greed or leverage to extort other concessions from his wife, such as custody of children,
favorable property divisions or maintenance agreements. See Barbara J. Redman, Jewish Di-
vorce: What Can Be Done in Secular Courts to Aid the Jewish Woman, 19 GA. L. REV. 389, 392
(1985) ("The wife in this situation has two choices: she can refuse to impoverish herself and
suffer the consequences of being an adulteress and raising bastards, or she can agree to an ineq-
uitable divorce contract which deprives her of all fair return from her contribution to the mar-
riage and severely disadvantages her economically.").
67. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 321.
68. Id.
69. Id.
70. Kahan, supra note 19, at 201. Since a civil divorce is not recognized by Jewish law., parties
who fail to comply with the get requirement are unable to remarry within the Jewish faith. Id.
This is especially true of women, as will become evident from the discussion immediately
following.
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3. Consequences of the Get Requirement
Since a civil divorce is not recognized by Jewish law, any subsequent
cohabitation or remarriage exercised in the absence of a get is consid-
ered adulterous.7' Jewish law, however, provides different conse-
quences for men than for women regarding remarriage and
subsequent children in the absence of a get.72 For example, children
resulting from a wife's remarriage, without a get from her previous
marriage, are regarded as illegitimate.73 However, the husband's sub-
sequent children are not stamped with the same inferior status.74 This
disparate treatment relates back to the Biblical allowance for men, but
not women, to practice polygamy. 75
While Talmudic law officially banned the practice of polygamy, Jew-
ish law regarding relations in general, and remarriage specifically, is
still far more lenient for men than it is for women.76 For instance, the
consequences of adultery for a married man are substantially more
relaxed than those for a married woman.77 Additionally, if a woman
whose marriage has not yet been dissolved by the receipt of a get
cohabitates with another man, regardless of whether the man is mar-
ried, she and the man are guilty of a capital offense according to Jew-
ish law.78 Any children resulting from that union are considered
illegitimate and are prohibited from marrying another Jew unless that
person is also illegitimate or a convert.79 Moreover, subsequent to the
wife's divorce from her husband, she may not marry her lover.80
On the other hand, if a married man commits adultery with an un-
married woman, "under Biblical law no crime has been committed."
81
"The husband is permitted to remain with his wife if she consents and
71. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 323.
72. Id. at 323-25. These consequences will be significant to this Comment's assertion that a
court's refusal to compel recalcitrant husbands to procure a get amounts to a denial of Equal
Protection under the law for women.
73. Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 323-24.
74. Id. at 324.
75. Id. at 322-23.
76. Id. at 322-25.
77. Id. at 323.
78. Id. (citing Deuteronomy 23:22).
79. Id. at 324 n.48.
80. Id. (citing SHULCHAN ARUCH, Even Haezer 11:1). "The Shulchan Aruch ... is regarded as
the definitive code of Jewish law by Orthodox Jewry." Id. at 318 n.15.
81. Id. at 324. This simply means that the husband has not committed adultery. Id. Under
strict Biblical law, a married man cohabitating with an unmarried woman is no different than if
both were unmarried. Id. "The marital status of the man is simply irrelevant." Id. Moreover,
the children of such a relationship are not stigmatized as illegitimate. Id.
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even perhaps if she does not."82 While a woman can never remarry
within her faith without a get, a man may marry again while remaining
religiously married to the first spouse.83 Thus, according to traditlional
Jewish law, even if the man does not procure a valid get, his remar-
riage will not be condemned and his children will not be considered
culturally inferior, while the same clearly does not hold true for his
wife.
Recently, there have been a growing number of cases which grapple
with issues of Jewish marriage and divorce. 84 The question of the get
requirement necessarily arises whenever a Jewish couple divorce; and
one party seeks an accompanying religious divorce while the other
denies it.85 Not only is Jewish law pertinent in deciding these cases,
but several First and Fourteenth Amendment issues are raised as well.
C. First Amendment Issues
The First Amendment mandates that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exer-
cise thereof ... .-"86 The first clause of the First Amendment is termed
the "Establishment Clause. '8 7 The second is the "Free Exercise
Clause. ' 88 There is a "natural antagonism between the two clauses of
the First Amendment. ' 89 Specifically, the Establishment Clause com-
mands no establishment of religion and the Free Exercise Clause com-
mands no inhibition of the practice of religion.90 Essentially, the First
82. Id. Further, should the husband subsequently divorce his wife, he is allowed to marry his
lover. Id.
83. Id. at 325.
84. See infra notes 175-232 and accompanying text (discussing In re Marriage of Goldman, 554
N.E.2d 1016 (I11. App. Ct. 1990); Burns v. Bums, 538 A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1987); Minkin v.
Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E. 2d 136 (N.Y. Ct. App.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983); Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) and other
get cases).
85. See, e.g., Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1020-24 (referring to expert testimony that a get is re-
quired to dissolve a Jewish marriage and addressing the enforceability of the same); Minkin, 434
A.2d at 665 (noting the wife's assertion that without a get she is restrained from remarrying
within the Jewish faith and the husband's claim that he cannot be compelled to give a get because
to do so would violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment).
86. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
87. JOHN E. NOWAK & RONALD D. ROTUNDA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (4th ed. 1991). See
infra notes 97-110 and accompanying text (discussing the Establishment Clause).
88. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1157. See infra notes 111-26 and accompanying
text (discussing the Free Exercise Clause). The First Amendment is applicable to the states by
the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at
1157. The Free Exercise Clause was first held applicable to the states in Cantwell v. Connecticut,
310 U.S. 296 (1940). Id.
89. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1157.
90. Id. (citing U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.).
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Amendment prohibits the government from affording special treat-
ment to any religion. 91 At the same time, the First Amendment re-
quires the government to reasonably accommodate religious
practices. 92 This tension between the clauses often requires courts to
choose between competing values in religion cases.93
Some legal scholars have read the First Amendment in its entirety
to require that the government "act to achieve secular goals in a relig-
iously neutral manner." 94 Inevitably, situations arise where the state
helps or hinders religious groups, individuals, or practices although it
proceeds with its secular goals in a neutral manner.95 Whether or not
this situation is viewed as undesirable may depend upon whose rights,
and what rights, are being protected or jeopardized.96
91. Id.
92. See, e.g., Corporation of the Presiding Bishop of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-Day
Saints v. Amos, 483 U.S. 327, 338 (1987) (asserting that there is "ample room" for accommoda-
tion where the government acts with a proper purpose). Cf Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 350-51
(stating that the Free Exercise Clause requires the government to "structure its programs" so as
not to interfere with the practice of religion).
93. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1157 ("In a sense, the conferral of a benefit on one
group may be perceived as a burden to another."); Lawrence M. Warmflash, The New York
Approach to Enforcing Religious Marriage Contracts: From Avitzur to the Get Statute, 50
BROOK. L. REv. 229, 240 (1984) (citing Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963); Wisconsin v.
Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972)).
94. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 1157.
95. Id.; see Amos, 483 U.S. at 327 (holding that the government may accommodate religious
practices without violating the Establishment Clause even though a statute may "single out reli-
gious entities for benefit"); Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n. 480 U.S. 136 (1987)
(holding that the state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who
was discharged because she refused to work on her Sabbath constituted a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment); Thomas v. Review Bd.. 450 U.S. 707 (1981) (holding
that the state's denial of unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who terminated
his job because his religious beliefs forbade him from participating in the production of arma-
ments violated the First Amendment right to free exercise of religion): Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406
U.S. 205 (1972) (holding that the First and Fourteenth Amendments prevented the state from
compelling Amish parents to cause their children, who have graduated from eighth grade, to
continue to receive formal education where their religious beliefs called for informal religious
and vocational education); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) (holding that the state may
not deny unemployment compensation benefits to an individual who had refused alternative
employment due to her religious beliefs, which forbade her to work on Saturday).
96. See Board of Educ. v. Grumet, Nos. 93-517, 93-527, 93-539, 1994 U.S. LEXIS 4830, at *58-
65 (June 27, 1994) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (praising the plurality's refusal to focus on the
strict Establishment Clause test of Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602 (1971), because issues of
the separation of church and state are highly contextual). Justice O'Connor asserted that "what
makes accommodation permissible, even praiseworthy, is not that the government is making life
easier for some particular religious group as such. Rather, it is that the government is accommo-
dating a deeply held belief." Id. at *54 (O'Connor, J., concurring).
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1. Establishment Clause
"The essence of the Establishment Clause is that states must remain
neutral and detached from religious activities. ' 97 In Lemon v. Kurtz-
man,98 the Supreme Court set forth a three-prong test for determining
whether a state action constitutes a violation of the Establishment
Clause.99 According to the test, the Establishment Clause requires
that any governmental action, including a court order, (1) have a secu-
lar purpose; (2) have a primary effect that neither advances nor inhib-
its religion; and (3) not lead to excessive entanglement with
religion.1oo
In adhering to the strictures of the Establishment Clause, then,
courts are prohibited from becoming involved in disagreements over
religious doctrine or practice since such disputes necessarily "entan-
gle" the government with religion.101 As a means of sidestepping the
constraints of the excessive entanglement doctrine, courts have ex-
amined "undisputed points of religious doctrine."'10 2 The Supreme
97. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 240.
98. 403 U.S. 602 (1971).
99. Id. at 612.
100. Id. at 612-13. Although the Lemon test is still applied in Establishment Clause cases,
there is doubt as to its continuing validity. See, e.g., Grumet, Nos. 93-517, 93-527, 93-539, 1994
U.S. LEXIS 4830, at *59 (O'Connor, J., concurring) (suggesting that "setting forth a unitary test
for a broad set of cases may sometimes do more harm than good"); Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S.
668, 678 (1984) (stating that "[r]ather than mechanically invalidating all governmental conduct
... that confer[s] benefits or give[s] special recognition to religion in general or to one faith ...
the Court has scrutinized challenged legislation or official conduct to determine whether, in real-
ity, it establishes a religion or religious faith, or tends to do so").
101. A group of cases, known as the "church property cases," illustrates the nature of this
prohibition against excessive entanglement. See Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-04 (1979)
(holding that application of the "neutral principles of law" approach does not constitute: exces-
sive entanglement "since it relies exclusively on objective, well-established concepts of ... law,"
even though it requires some examination of religious documents); Serbian Eastern Orthodox
Diocese v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696, 724-25 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment requires
that civil courts defer to the decisions of the highest court of the hierarchical church organization
in order to avoid entanglement in religious issues that ultimately rest on interpretation of reli-
gious doctrine for resolution); Presbyterian Church in the United States v. Mary Elizabeth Blue
Hull Memorial Presbyterian Church, 393 U.S. 440, 449 (1969) (holding that the First Amend-
ment prohibits civil courts from resolving church property disputes on the basis of religious doc-
trine and practice; such a resolution requires a court to become entangled in the interpretation
of ecclesiastical doctrine).
102. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 245-48. For example, in Schwartzman v. Schwartzman, 388
N.Y.S.2d 993 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1976), a husband sought to enjoin his ex-wife from attempting to
change the religion of their children from Judaism to Catholicism. Id. The court, in holding that
the husband could not claim a Jewish birthright for his children, based its reasoning on an exami-
nation of Jewish law, which mandates that a child's religion is the same as that of its mother. Id.
at 996 (citing TALMUD, Order Nashim: Tractate Kiddushen 66b); see also Rubin v. Rubin, 348
N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1973) (holding that secular courts, in enforcing the religious rights of
groups or individuals, must note religious requirements).
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Court has held that courts may look to and apply religious doctrine as
long as they "defer to the interpretation given by the religious author-
ity [and] do not attempt to resolve any dispute within the church
about the substance of the doctrine."'103 Courts often justify their re-
sort to religious doctrine with a compelling state interest.1°4 In deter-
mining whether the Establishment Clause has been violated, courts
must first decide whether the act in question is religious in nature. 10 5
This may be answered by examining "whether the act has any rational
justification other than the significance that some religion puts on
it."106
According to many Jewish scholars, the get procedure is not reli-
gious in nature because it involves no act of prayer or worship. 10 7 It
concerns only the relationship between a married couple and is there-
fore considered secular. Numerous scholars maintain that Jewish law
is divisible into two parts, one "strictly religious" because it involves
the relationship between man and God, and the other "essentially sec-
ular" since it controls the relationship between man and man. 08 Ac-
cording to such a classification, Jewish marriage and divorce laws
would necessarily fall into the latter category.10 9 Although there are
arguments to the contrary, authority for the proposition that appear-
ance before a beth din, for purposes of procuring a religious divorce, is
not a religious act has been determinative in the courtroom." 0
2. Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause requires that states accommodate reli-
gious beliefs so that there is no imposition of undue burdens on the
103. Jones, 443 U.S. at 602 (citing Milivojevich, 426 U.S. at 724-25); see also Aglikin v.
Kovachef, 516 N.E.2d 706 (Il1. App. Ct. 1987) (holding that a court may adopt neutral principles
of law but must defer on doctrinal issues).
104. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 246 (stating that in Schwartzman, the court considered the
general welfare of children as its overriding interest in validating its review of Jewish law).
105. Marshall, supra note 44, at 217-18.
106. Id. at 219.
107. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text (discussing the expert testimony of four
rabbis in Minkin which recognized the secular nature of the get procedure).
108. See e.g., Bleich, supra note 25, at 202 (arguing that "the get is not at all a sacerdotal or
religious act. It is not an act of worship; it does not invoke the deity; it involves neither profes-
sion of creed nor confession of faith").
109. See Warmflash, supra note 93, at 243 (concluding that Jewish law concerning domestic
relations is secular and not religious in nature); see also Stem v. Stem, N.Y. L.J., Aug. 8, 1979, at
13 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1979) (holding that the Jewish divorce procedure is not a religious act).
110. See Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (relying on rabbinic
testimony in finding that procuring a get is not a religious act). But see Marshall, supra note 44,
at 219 ("[I]t is clear that any appearance before a religious tribunal for the purpose of exercising
a religious divorce is per se religious in nature. There is no secular justification for such a divorce
since a civil divorce legally terminates the marriage.").
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free practice of religion.'1 ' In order to claim a violation of the Free
Exercise Clause, two requirements must be satisfied by the proponent
of the claim: (1) a "sincere" religious belief or practice must have
been violated; and (2) the violation must be the result of a govern-
mental action." 2 The Court in Yoder'13 relied on four factors to de-
termine whether a particular belief was, in fact, religious.114 Those
four factors are as follows: (1) the belief must be shared by an organ-
ized group rather than a personal preference; (2) the belief must be
related to certain theocratic principles and interpretations of religious
literature; (3) the system of beliefs must pervade and regulate the be-
lievers' daily lives; and (4) the system of beliefs and life style resulting
therefrom must have been in existence for a substantial period of
time." 5
The Supreme Court established a two-prong test in Sherbert v. Ver-
ner,1 6 for determining whether a governmental action, including a
court order, constitutes a violation of an individual's free exercise of
religion.'1 7 In order for an action to violate an individual's free exer-
cise rights, it must (1) impose a significant burden upon the individ-
ual's free exercise of religion; and (2) not be overcome by a
compelling interest."18
Courts have allowed interference with a party's religious beliefs if
the interference was slight and based on a compelling state interest." 9
111. U.S. CONST. amend. I. Numerous cases illustrate the principle that the Constitution "af-
firmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all religions, and forbids hostility
toward any." Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 673 (1984); see County of Allegheny v. ACLU,
492 U.S. 573 (1989) (permitting the municipality to erect an 18-foot Chanukah menorah in its
holiday display); Mueller v. Allen, 463 U.S. 388, 394-95 (1983) (allowing tax deductions for ex-
penses of religious education); Wolman v. Walter, 433 U.S. 229, 236 (1977) (upholding aid to
religious schools); Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y., 397 U.S. 664, 672 (1970) (permitting tax exemp-
tion for church property); Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236, 243 (1968) (upholding textbook
loans to students in religious schools).
112. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The Free Exercise Clause protects only
sincere religious beliefs. Id. at 215. The Yoder Court defined a "sincere" religious belief as a
belief that is central to the faith and the continuing survival of the religion as it exists. Id. at 209-
10.
113. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
114. Id. at 215-17.
115. Id.
116. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
117. Id. at 403; see also Marshall, supra note 44, at 214 (discussing the test applied in
Sherbert).
118. Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 403.
119. There are a number of cases which have held that the state's compelling interest in end-
ing discrimination is sufficient to override an incidental burden on a party's religious beliefs.
See, e.g., Ohio Civil Rights Comm. v. Dayton Christian Schools, 477 U.S. 619 (1986) (holding
that an incidental burden on religion is overridden by the compelling state interest in ending
discrimination); Roberts v. United States Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609 (1984) (holding that the compel-
[Vol. 45:493
1996] JEWISH MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 509
For example, in In re Marriage of Tisckos,120 the court upheld a judg-
ment requiring a father to drive his daughter to Catholic services dur-
ing visitation even though he was a Baptist, and driving his daughter
to church would interfere with his activities at his Baptist church. 121
The court decided that driving his daughter to church would only
slightly interfere with the father's religious activity, and further held
that the father had a duty to enable the daughter "to fulfill her reli-
gious obligation."' 22 Similarly, in In re Marriage of Roberts, 23 the
court rejected a father's attempt to deny visitation rights to his ex-wife
on the ground that visitation would violate his free exercise rights.' 24
Here, the court found that continued visitation rights affected only the
mother's rights, and any burden imposed on the father's free exercise
of religion were slight and incidental. 2 5 Thus, when the parties' free
exercise rights are in conflict or when there is an overriding concern,
the state will tolerate an incidental burden on one party's religious
beliefs. 126
D. Burden on Free Exercise Rights In Religious Divorce Context
According to the first part of the Sherbert test, a court must ex-
amine whether, in compelling a religious divorce, the state is imposing
a burden on the party's free exercise of religion. 27 In order to clarify
exactly what constitutes a burden on an individual's right to free exer-
cise, one commentator has recognized four distinct categories of bur-
dens on free exercise on religion. 28 First, there is a burden where the
ling state interest in ending discrimination is enough to overcome a First Amendment freedom
of association claim); Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574 (1983) (removing the tax-
exempt status from a religious college that engaged in racial discrimination).
120. 514 N.E.2d 523 (II1. App. Ct. 1987).
121. Id. at 529.
122. Id.
123. 503 N.E.2d 363 (I11. App. Ct. 1986).
124. Id. at 364. The court held that "[t]he order is unrelated to the [the father's] freedom to
practice his religion as he desires because the order is only directed at the rights of the [ex-
wife]." Id.; see also Lane v. Lane, 340 N.E.2d 705, 709-10 (Il1. App. Ct. 1976) (rejecting the
divorced husband's claim that continued provision of alimony payments to his ex-wife who had
become a nun constituted an infringement on his free exercise rights and an establishment of
religion); Smith v. Smith, 92 N.E.2d 358 (I11. App. Ct. 1950) (affirming enforcement of a custody
decree requiring the child to be reared Catholic).
125. Roberts, 503 N.E.2d at 364.
126. See Jehovah's Witnesses v. King County Hosp., 390 U.S. 598 (1968) (per curiam) (holding
summarily that a parent could not, on religious grounds, withhold a blood transfusion that was
necessary to save the child's life).
127. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403 (1963); see also Marshall, supra note 44, at 214
(discussing the application of the Sherbert test).
128. Marshall, supra note 44, at 214.
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state forces an individual to do something forbidden by his religion;129
second, the state imposes a burden when it prevents an individual
from doing that which is required by his religion;130 third, where the
state makes religious observance more difficult or expensive, it is bur-
dening the individual's free exercise;13' and fourth, a burden exists
where "the state forces an individual to do something 'religious' which
he wishes not to do, although his opposition is not necessarily based
on his religious beliefs. 1 32
Often, in religious divorce cases, one spouse (most often, the hus-
band) raises a free exercise claim that the state cannot force him to do
something that he considers religious.133 Where the party seeks to re-
main "religiously neutral" the court must initially determine whether
the act of giving a get is in fact "religious." 34 While arguments exist
both for and against the proposition that obtaining a get constitutes a
"religious" act,' 35 the prevailing legal theory is that forcing a religious
divorce is not forcing an act religious by nature. 136 This Comment
adopts the predominant view of the courts, and thus contends that any
burden such an act imposes on an individual is not only incidental but
disassociated from a genuine free exercise claim.137 If, however, the
129. Id.; see, e.g., United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982) (forcing Amish to withhold social
security tax).
130. Marshall, supra note 44, at 214; see, e.g., Reynolds v. United States, 98 U.S. 145 (1978)
(prohibiting Mormons from practicing polygamy).
131. Marshall, supra note 44, at 214; see, e.g., Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574
(1983) (removing the tax-exempt status from a religious college that engaged in racial
discrimination).
132. Marshall, supra note 44, at 214; see also John H. Garvey, Freedom and Choice in Consti-
tutional Law, 94 HARV. L. REV. 1756 (1981) (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause "guarantees
that the state can no more command piety than it can forbid it").
133. Marshall, supra note 44, at 215. The cases in this area frequently address the husband's
claim that the state cannot enforce the ketubah without violating the Free Exercise Clause. See
e.g., In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1022-24 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (finding the hus-
band's free exercise claim without merit).
134. Marshall, supra note 44, at 215 (quoting Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16(1972)).
135. For example, one commentator feverently argues that obtaining a get is a religious act.
Marshall, supra note 44, at 219-223. Marshall asserts that since the act of procuring a get "has no
rational secular justification," it must be considered a religious act. Id. at 219. He maintains that
"any appearance before a religious tribunal for the purpose of securing a religious divorce is per
se religious in nature," and there can be "no secular justification for such a divorce since a civil
divorce legally terminates the marriage." Id. Marshall equates the "mundane" act of securing a
religious divorce with taking communion or eating nonkosher food. Id. at 219. "While neither
of those acts explicitly invokes the deity, a court is prohibited from ordering an individual to
perform such acts which are considered religious by nature." Id.
136. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1024 (finding that the get procedure did not require any act
of worship or any expression of religious beliefs); Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-68 (determining that
the get procedure is not religious in nature).
137. See infra notes 261-75 and accompanying text (discussing the get cases in light of the Free
Exercise Clause).
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proponent of the claim is able to convince the court that the state has
imposed a real burden on his free exercise of religion, this claim may
be readily overcome by more than one secular and compelling state
interest.
E. Compelling State Interests
Authority supporting the theory that domestic relations should be
governed by Jewish secular law is strong. Thus, a court order compel-
ling the husband to provide his wife with a get often has not been
considered as enforcing a "religious" act. However, assuming for the
sake of argument, that such an order does infringe upon the husband's
free exercise rights, it does so only incidentally and is overridden by a
number of compelling state interests.138 While numerous scholars and
courts have found the freedom to contract to be the overriding com-
pelling interest, 39 as will be duly discussed, this Comment rather fa-
vors equal protection of the law and the freedom to remarry as the
more substantial and convincing state interests with which to counter
a free exercise claim.
1. The Ketubah as a Contract
It has been argued quite successfully that the ketubah is an enforce-
able contract, and that in compelling husbands to grant their wives a
get, courts are merely upholding a secular provision of a contract. 40
In so ruling, a number of courts have equated the ketubah to other
antenuptial agreements, which set out methods for resolving disputes
in advance.141 In fact, one author has stated that the "only interest
138. See infra notes 233-45, 292-98 and accompanying text (discussing various state interests
furthered by compelling a religious divorce proceeding).
139. See, e.g., Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023 (finding that the order at issue did not violate the
Establishment Clause because it had the secular purpose of enforcing a contract between the
parties); Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39 (deciding the case at hand "solely upon the application of
neutral principals of contract law"); see also Marshall, supra note 44, at 233 ("[I]t seems evident
that the only potential compelling governmental interest in religious divorce cases is the enforce-
ment of contractual obligations.").
140. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1018-22 (holding that the get procedure is secular in nature);
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39 (concluding that the procurement of the get requires no religious
affirmations).
141. See, e.g., Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39 ("[T]he relief sought.., is simply to compel [the
husband] to perform a secular obligation ...."). The Avitzurs did not use a traditional ketubah,
which makes no mention of submission to the beth din. Id. Rather they signed an English trans-
lation containing a clause requiring the parties to appear before the beth din to solve marital
problems, which Marshall argues serves to emphasize the document's secular, legal impact.
Marshall, supra note 44, at 225 n.98.
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sufficiently compelling to justify enforcing a religious divorce on un-
willing parties is the state's interest in enforcing valid contracts."'1 42
While the notion of the ketubah as a legally valid contract is widely
accepted, there is an equally convincing argument to the contrary.
The opposing argument is that the ketubah may not be interpreted
under traditional contract law because it fails to comply with basic
contract principles. 143 One author asserts that in most cases, the sign-
ing of the ketubah is part of a ritual that is "entered into out of respect
for tradition and family expectations rather than an intent that its con-
tents may be enforced in a secular court."'"1 This is especially true
since the vast majority of couples signing a ketubah do not even un-
derstand, or bother to have translated, the provisions therein. 45
Thus, the ketubah may be differentiated from other antenuptial agree-
ments in that it is neither negotiated nor bargained for at arms
length.146
2. Fourteenth Amendment
The Fourteenth Amendment commands that no state shall "deny to
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws."'1 47
The Equal Protection Clause guarantees that all individuals similarly
situated will be treated in a similar manner.' 48 This constitutional
guarantee governs "all state actions which classify individuals for dif-
ferent benefits or burdens under the law."'1 49 The Supreme Court has
used the notion of equal protection to guarantee that all individuals
are "accorded fair treatment in the exercise of fundamental rights or
in the elimination of distinctions based on impermissible criteria.' 150
142. Marshall, supra note 44, at 206, 233. Marshall looks to the Avitzur-type of ketubah to
show that parties may exhibit a knowing intention to be bound by its terms. Id. at 225.
143. Kahan, supra note 19, at 216-19 (arguing that the intent to be contractually bound is
absent when signing the kenibah).
144. Id.
145. Id.; see also Marshall, supra note 44, at 225 n.98 (recognizing that the parties infrequently
understand the meaning of the ketubah in a literal sense). Even Marshall, who defends the
notion that the ketubah is a binding legal contract, concedes that the typical ketubah, which is
written in Hebrew and Aramaic, is more often viewed as a "liturgical rather than legal" docu-
ment. Id.
146. Kahan, supra note 19, at 216.
147. U.S. CoNsT. amend XIV.
148. See NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 568 (discussing the Equal Protection Clause
of the Constitution).
149. Id.
150. Id.
[Vol. 45:493
1996] JEWISH MARRIAGE & DIVORCE 513
Our nation's definition of "liberty" includes the freedom of choice
to engage in, or refrain from, certain activities. 151 When those activi-
ties are specifically recognized in the Constitution, the right to engage
in them is protected by the Due Process guarantee of the Fourteenth
Amendment. 152 The Court, however, will actively protect only those
constitutional rights deemed to be "fundamental."' 5 3 "Fundamental
rights are those with textual recognition in the Constitution, or its
amendments, or values found to be implied because they are indispen-
sable to our notion of freedom, as reflected by history and interpreta-
tion by the Supreme Court."'1 54
The Court recognized this concept of "fundamental rights" when it
incorporated most of the guarantees of the Bill of Rights into the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and applied them to
the states.'5 5 Among those fundamental rights found to be implied in
the Constitution, the most significant are the right to freedom of asso-
ciation,' 56 the right to' interstate travel,157 the right to vote,15 8 and the
right to privacy'5 9 which includes freedom of choice in marital, 60 fam-
151. Id. at 505. The Court has recognized these rights as being "essential to individual liberty
in our society." Id. at 388.
152. Id. The Due Process Clause provides that no state shall "deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV.
153. Id.
154. Id. The Supreme Court also guards those rights which do not have specific textual basis
in the Constitution. Id. at 388. In particular, the Court has used the Due Process Clause to
advance the use of a "natural law analysis to select and protect those liberties which are essential
in our society." Id.
155. Id. at 505. In the early cases, the Court determined whether a specific right was so funda-
mental that it could be said to be "implicit in the concept of ordered liberty." Palko v. Connecti-
cut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937). Subsequently, the Court relaxed the test to ascertain whether the
right was "fundamental to the American scheme of justice." Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145,
148-49 (1968). The modified test shows a "willingness on the Court's part to enforce those val-
ues which have a special importance in the development of individual liberty in American soci-
ety, even if that value was not deemed to be absolutely necessary to the system of a democratic
government." NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 385.
156. See NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (recognizing the freedom to engage in
association for the advancement of beliefs and ideas).
157. See U.S. v. Guest, 383 U.S. 745, 757 (1966) (holding that the right to travel from one
State to another is a fundamental right).
158. See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 560 (1964) (holding that voting is a fundamental right
protected under the Constitution).
159. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 505. The term "right to privacy" has come to
mean a right to engage in certain highly personal activities. Id.
160. See, e.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 384 (1978) (holding that individuals have a
fundamental right to marry under the Fourteenth Amendment); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1,
12 (1967) (striking down a statute prohibiting interracial marriage as a denial of due process);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541 (1942) (finding that state interference with the funda-
mental rights of marriage and procreation requires a compelling government interest).
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ily,161 and sexual matters. 162 Numerous Supreme Court decisions
"make clear that freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage
and family life is one of the liberties protected by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. ' 163
3. Fundamental Right to Remarry
The right to freedom of choice regarding matters of marriage and
family relationships is "at the core of the right to privacy."' 64 The
fundamental right to remarry may be inferred from the freedom of
choice in maital matters. For example, in Boddie v. Connecticut, 65
the Court held that the state could not refuse to grant a divorce to
those persons who are unable to pay court filing fees since the Court
has decided that the right to marry, and hence divorce, is a fundamen-
tal right under the Due Process Clause. 166 In Zablocki v. Redhail,167
the Court took the right to privacy one step further by indirectly pro-
tecting the right to remarry.168 There, the Court struck down a state
law which prevented persons from marrying if they failed to meet
their financial obligations to pay alimony or child support arising from
an earlier marriage and divorce. 169 This ruling effectively extended
the right to privacy to include the right to subsequent marriages as one
of the fundamental rights that the Fourteenth Amendment seeks to
protect. 70
States have a secular interest in enabling its citizens to remarry fol-
lowing a decree of dissolution, and in facilitating the removal of any
barriers that prevent the exercise of this fundamental right.171 Some
states have even enacted statutes in order to effectuate such goals. 72
161. See, e.g., Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399 (1923) (holding that the Fourteenth
Amendment guarantees the right to marry, establish a home and raise children).
162. See, e.g., Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (holding that the right to contraception
is a fundamental right).
163. Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 564 (1989) (Stevens, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part); see also Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (holding
that decisions regarding child rearing and education are matters of privacy properly protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment).
164. NOWAK & ROTUNDA, supra note 87, at 763.
165. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
166. 1d. at 374.
167. 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
168. See id. at 384-87 (extending the fundamental right to marry to include decisions related
to marriage).
169. Id at 383-86.
170. Id. at 384-87.
171. See Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 354 (referring to the New York get statute).
172. See, e.g., 750 ILCS 5/102 (West 1995) (providing statutory support for the right to
remarry).
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For example, in Illinois, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act serves to "promote the amicable settlement of disputes that
have arisen between parties to a marriage;" and to "mitigate the po-
tential harm to the spouses and their children caused by the process of
legal dissolution of marriage."'1 73 By enforcing the get proceeding,
courts are not only enforcing the state's secular goals as expressed by
its statutes, but are also protecting the parties' constitutional rights.174
E. Case Law Governing Enforcement of the Get Procedure
The current Illinois law governing Jewish divorces, as decided by In
re Marriage of Goldman,175 follows the majority of courts in finding
ways to civilly enforce the get procedure. 76 Most courts dealing with
the issue of enforcement of the get provision have upheld it against
contentions that enforcement would infringe upon the constitutional
separation of church and state since the court would, in effect, be forc-
ing one of the parties to participate in a religious divorce proceeding
against his/her will, or that it would promote divorce in contravention
of public policy. 177 Courts have been most successful in upholding the
173. Id.
174. See Breitowitz, supra note 28, at 354 (recognizing that enforcement of the get proceeding
encourages marriage, stabilizes family life, and protects the fundamental right of privacy which
encompasses the freedom to remarry).
175. 554 N.E.2d 1016 (I1. App. Ct. 1990).
176. See id. at 1024 (finding that the get procedure is essentially secular in nature, and there-
fore, the husband's constitutional rights were not infringed).
177. See Cook v. Cook, No. FA 90-0376937, 1992 Conn. Super. LEXIS 1589 (Conn. Super. Ct.
May 26, 1992) (holding that the court could order both parties to cooperate in obtaining the get);
In re Scholl v. Scholl, 621 A.2d 808 (Del. 1992) (holding that enforcement of the get provision
was proper because the husband may be compelled to do that which he already agreed to do
when he signed the ketubah); Fleischer v. Fleischer, 586 So. 2d 1253 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1991)
(holding that the husband waived his First Amendment challenge to enforcement of the get
provision by signing the ketubah and so the court order requiring him to deliver a get was
proper); In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (11. App. Ct. 1990); Bums v. Bums, 538
A.2d 438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding that since the husband's refusal to grant the get
was not based on genuine religious beliefs, the court order compelling him to submit to the
jurisdiction of the beth din to initiate the procedure to secure a get would not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause); Megibow v. Megibow, 612 N.Y.S.2d 758 (N.Y. App. Div. 1994) (relying on
§ 253 in reaching its conclusion that the husband is required to cooperate in all phases of secur-
ing a get); Kaplinsky v. Kaplinsky. 603 N.Y.S.2d 574 (N.Y. App. Div. 1993) (holding that the
court may hold the husband in contempt for failure to deliver a get to his wife); Perl v. Perl, 512
N.Y.S.2d 372 (N.Y. App. Div. 1987) (holding that once a party seeks the court's civil relief of
divorce, the husband's misuse of his get power is subject to review and revision by the court);
Waxstein v. Waxstein, 394 N.Y.S.2d 253 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (granting specific performance of
an agreement to give a get where it was incorporated into the written separation agreement);
Shapiro v. Shapiro, 442 N.Y.S.2d 928 (Sp. Term. 1981) (holding an Israeli divorce decree as
enforceable in the jurisdiction and so the court may force the husband to procure the get for his
wife); Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973). But see Victor v. Victor, 866 P.2d
899 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that the court was without jurisdiction to order a husband to
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get provision of the ketubah by construing the ketubah as a legally
binding contract, with some courts equating it with any other antenup-
tial contract. 178
In so finding, courts have relied on the expert testimonies of Ortho-
dox rabbis who contend that the acquisition of a get does not consti-
tute a religious act, but rather is the "severance of a secular
contractual relationship between the two parties."'1 79 Thus, the major-
ity of courts have determined that an order compelling a recalcitrant
husband to secure a get has the secular purpose of completing a disso-
lution of a marriage since it does not require the husband to partici-
pate in a "religious" ceremony. 1 0 As such, a court order enforcing
the get provision effectively serves the state's interest in allowing par-
ties to remarry without violating the First Amendment.
1. Pre-Goldman Cases
A 1983 New York case involving enforcement of the ketubah set the
current trend in this area of the law, and caused the enactment of a
statute in New York. 181 In Avitzur v. Avitzur,182 the court held that
the provision in the ketubah which articulated the parties' intention to
appear before the beth din in seeking marital advice or counseling was
civilly enforceable and subject to specific performance under general
contract principles.183 Rejecting the husband's argument that enforce-
ment of the ketubah provision would necessarily intrude upon matters
grant his wife a get); Turner v. Trner, 192 So. 2d 787, cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1966)
(holding the get provision in a ketubah unenforceable by a civil court); Steinberg v. Steinberg,
No. 44125, slip op. (Ohio Ct. App. June 24, 1982) (holding that the get provision was unenforce-
able as a contractual provision on the basis that its enforcement would violate the Constitution);
Pal v. Pal, 356 N.Y.S.2d 672 (N.Y. App. Div. 1974) (holding that a civil court had no authority to
order the parties to submit to the beth din); Marguilies v. Marguilies, 344 N.Y.S.2d 482 (N.Y.
App. Div. 1973) (holding that a get must be obtained from the husband's own free will and so the
court order forcing him to comply with the proceeding would be a nullity). For a complete
discussion of the foregoing cases, see Andrea G. Nadel, Annotation: Enforceability of Agree-
ment Requiring Spouse's Cooperation in Obtaining Religious Bill of Divorce, 29 A.L.R. 4TH 746
(1995).
178. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39. See infra notes 196-203 and accompanying text (discussing
pre-Avitzur cases which enforced the ketubah on general contract principles).
179. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1022; Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39; Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-68.
180. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1022; Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138-39; Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667-68.
181. N.Y. DOM. REL LAW § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1983). For a discussion of the New York
statute, see infra notes 190-95 and accompanying text. One commentator has suggested that the
Avitzur decision is consistent with the current developments in family law, which includes in-
creasing judicial enforcement of antenuptial agreements. Kahan, supra note 19, at 194.
182. 446 N.E.2d 136, cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
183. Id. at 139.
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of religious doctrine and practice,1 4 the court said that it was not
compelling a religious procedure arising out of religious law, but
rather was enforcing a prenuptial agreement made by the parties to
"appear before and accept the decision of a designated tribunal. '185
The court noted that the order only compelled the husband to appear
before the beth din, not to actually obtain a get.186
Viewed in this manner, the court found that the ketubah was
"closely analogous to an antenuptial agreement by which parties agree
in advance to resolution of disputes which may subsequently arise."'1 87
The court said that the ketubah should be entitled "no less dignity"
than other civil contracts to submit a dispute to a nonjudicial forum,
so long as its enforcement violates neither the law nor the public pol-
icy of the state.188 The Avitzur court decided that merely because the
obligation to appear before the beth din, spelled out in the ketubah,
was grounded in religious belief and practice, should not preclude en-
forcement of its secular terms. 189
The state of New York enacted a statute shortly after the Avitzur
decision which was a clear attempt by the legislature to alleviate the
problem created by Jewish law.190 The statute requires a spouse, upon
divorce, to take all steps within his or her power to remove "any reli-
gious or conscientious restraints" on the other spouse's remarriage.' 9'
Since the statute essentially requires spouses either to give or to ac-
cept a get before a civil court will enter a final divorce decree, the
statute has been appropriately labelled the "get statute.' 92 Propo-
184. The court determined that the case could be decided solely upon the application of neu-
tral principles of contract law without consideration of religious matters. Id. at 138 (citing Jones
v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1976)).
185. Id. at 138.
186. Id.
187. Id.
188. Id. In this case, the court found that the parties had agreed, by signing the ketubah, to
arbitrate disputes in accordance with Jewish law and tradition. Id.
189. Id. at 139. The court noted that the relief sought by the wife was simply to compel her
husband to appear before the beth din, a secular obligation to which he contractually bound
himself. Id. The court reasoned that since "no doctrinal issue need be passed upon, no imple-
mentation of a religious duty is contemplated, and no interference with religious authority will
result," the wife is entitled to the relief sought. Id.
190. Kahan, supra note 19, at 202 (citing N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw. § 253 (McKinney Supp.
1983)).
191. N.Y. DOM. REL LAw § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1983).
192. Kahan, supra note 19, at 194. One commentator, who argues that the get statute is un-
constitutional as violating the First Amendment, states that the statute is "nothing more than
'religious gerrymandering' since it turns the differences between the Catholic and Jewish divorce
procedures on their heads." Marshall, supra note 44, at 219 n.82. While the statute compels
issuance of a Jewish divorce, it purposefully fails to compel participation in a Catholic annulment
procedure. Id. The statute explicitly provides that it "shall not be constituted to include applica-
19961
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nents of the get statute maintain that its purpose is secular and that it
only requires parties to do "what they implicitly agreed to do when
they initially signed the ketubah."'193 By insisting that the parties re-
move all religious barriers to remarriage, the statute advances the sec-
ular purpose of divorce law and protects the fundamental right to
remarry. 194 Nonetheless, numerous commentators have criticized
both the Avitzur decision and the get statute as being
unconstitutional.195
Even before Avitzur and the get statute, courts were finding ways to
enforce the get proceeding. 96 In these early cases, courts usually em-
tion to a marriage tribunal or other similar organization or agency of a religious denomination
which has authority to annul or dissolve a marriage under the rules of such denomination." Id.
(citing N.Y. DoM. REL. LAw § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1983)). This effectively precludes the Cath-
olic annulment process from the confines of the statute. Id. In sum, Marshall argues that "the
obvious attempt to draft the statute to apply to a single religion is itself a violation of the Estab-
lishment Clause." Id.
193. Nathan Lewin, The Constitutional Validity of New York's Get Statute, N.Y. L.J., Nov. 16,
1983, at 1; see Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817
(1983) (finding that the get procedure is essentially secular). Under this view, the secular pur-
poses of the statute are to "facilitate the state interest in ensuring complete dissolution of the
marriage, providing for the care of the children, ensuring an equitable property settlement, and
ensuring freedom for the parties to remarry." Id.; see also In re Marriage of Goldman, 554
N.E.2d 1016 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (holding that the get procedure does not require an act of
worship or a religious affirmation).
194. Kahan, supra note 19, at 202.
195. See Feldman, supra note 10, at 140 (contending that the get procedure invokes religious
freedoms); Madeline Kochen, Constitutional Implications of New York's Get Statute, N.Y. L.J.,
Oct. 27, 1983, at 1; Elizabeth R. Leiberman, Avitzur v. Avitzur: The Constitutional Implications
of Judicially Enforcing Religious Agreements, 33 CATH. U. L. REV. 219 (1983) (arguing that
states are in need of Supreme Court direction to resolve religious disputes between individuals);
Marshall, supra note 44 (arguing that the get statute is both an unconstitutional burden on the
free exercise of religion and an unconstitutional establishment of religion); Nadel, supra note 177
(concluding that the get law presents serious problems under the First Amendment). But see
Warmflash, supra note 93 (concluding that while the New York get statute is of questionable
constitutionality and will most likely fail to accomplish its intended result, the approach taken by
the Avitzur court is one that presents an appropriate and constitutionally adequate response to
the issue of secular enforcement of Jewish legal obligations); Kahan, supra note 19 (arguing that
the judicial approach taken by the Avitzur court is far superior to the solution crafted by the
New York legislature); Tanina Rostain, Note, Permissible Accommodations of Religion: Recon-
sidering the New York Get Statute, 96 YALE L.J. 1147 (1987) (concluding that the get statute is a
permissible accommodation of religion).
196. See Kahan, supra note 19, at 211-12 (discussing the application of general contract princi-
ples to enforce the get procedure). A number of pre-Avitzur cases involved a written separation
agreement between the parties where one party was seeking to enforce one provision while
refusing to comply with another, usually the get provision. See, e.g., B. v. B., N.Y. L.J., May 4,
1978, at 7 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1978) (holding that an agreement to give a get constituted a vital term
of the settlement agreement); Waxstein v. Waxstein, 57 A.D.2d 863, (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1977) (grant-
ing specific performance of an agreement to give a get where it was incorporated into the written
separation agreement); Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1973) (upholding a
separation agreement that required the wife to accept a get where the wife was seeking enforce-
ment of the support provisions of the same agreement).
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ployed general contract principles, not hesitating to force parties to
adhere to agreements to give gittin when such parties wished to bene-
fit from other terms of the agreement, such as rights to support and
alimony.197 For instance, in Rubin v. Rubin,198 the parties had exe-
cuted a separation agreement that made support and alimony contin-
gent upon the wife's acceptance of a get.199 When the wife sued for
support under the separation agreement, the court refused to enforce
the support provision until she accepted the get.2°° The court saw co-
operation in a Jewish divorce as a condition precedent to enforcement
of the separation agreement between the parties.201 Thus, unlike
Avitzur and subsequent cases, which concerned the ketubah itself, pre-
Avitzur cases generally involved separation agreements that arguably
were negotiated at arms length and reflected the parties' real inten-
tions.202 In this setting, judges had little difficulty enforcing the get
promise as only one of the many conditions of the entire separation
agreement.203
Subsequently, some courts began to require a husband to deliver a
get on the basis of the traditional ketubah.204 For example, in Minkin
v. Minkin,205 the court found it proper to compel the husband to se-
cure a get in accordance with the terms of the traditional ketubah.206
The ketubah provides that the parties agree to abide by the "law of
Moses and Israel," laws which require the husband to give his wife a
get upon dissolution of the marriage.207 The court rejected the hus-
band's contention that the enforcement of the ketubah would violate
his First Amendment right to freedom of religion since, based on the
expert testimony of several distinguished rabbis, the court concluded
197. Kahan, supra note 19, at 211-12; see, e.g., Waxstein, 57 A.D. 863 (granting specific per-
formance of a promise to give a get where such a promise was part of a separation agreement
demanding that the wife vacate the marital residence and transfer title to the house and some
stock to her husband, and the wife had complied with her part of the deal). The court noted the
inherent unfairness of the husband's receipt of the benefits of the agreement without complying
with the "relatively-light burden" of giving a get. Id.
198. 348 N.Y.S.2d at 61.
199. Id. at 63-64.
200. Id. at 68.
201. Id. at 67.
202. Kahan, supra note 19, at 212.
203. One commentator has said that "a prenuptial or separation agreement conditioning vari-
ous benefits on the execution of a get may well have the desired effect of indirectly inducing
compliance." BRErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 80 n.224. In this way, the court is able to enforce
the get provision without having to touch upon the religious claim. Id.
204. Kahan, supra note 19, at 212.
205. 434 A.2d 665 (1981).
206. Id. at 666.
207. Id. at 665.
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that the ketubah document and get procedure were devoid of any reli-
gious connotation.208 Relying on the evidence of the rabbis' testimo-
nies, the court held that an order compelling the husband to secure a
get has the "clear secular purpose of completing a dissolution of the
marriage." 209
Like Minkin and similar cases before it, Avitzur was predicated on
neutral principles of contract law, which interpret the ketubah as any
other secular marriage contract that delineates the procedure to be
taken upon divorce.210 However, unlike Minkin, which required the
delivery of a get, the Avitzur court merely ordered the parties to ap-
pear before the beth din.21a The Goldman court used the Minkin ap-
proach by extracting the get requirement from the text of the ketubah
itself, rather than the Avitzur approach of granting specific perform-
ance of the beth din clause in the ketubah.212
2. The Goldman Case
One of the most recent cases in this area, In re Marriage of
Goldman,213 is the first case on the appellate level to construe the
ketubah as an implied contract to give a get. Unlike the Avitzur court,
which equated the ketubah with an antenuptial agreement allowing
parties to agree in advance to methods of dispute resolutions,214 the
Goldman court found that the ketubah document implicitly required
208. Id. at 667-68. Two of the rabbis who testified stated that the ketubah is basically a civil
contract which sets out the obligations of the parties during the marriage, under which the mar-
riage may be dissolved only by the death of one of the parties or by the acquisition of a get. Id.
at 667. The rabbis further testified that the get procedure does not involve a religious ceremony
or require a rabbi's presence. Id. Moreover, the husband does not have to believe in the reli-
gious tenets, state any doctrine or creed, or even acknowledge his Jewishness. Id. Two other
rabbis stated that Jewish law is not solely comprised of religious law, but instead is made up of
two components - one regulating man's relationship with God and the other controlling the
relationship between man and man. Id. at 668. The get procedure falls into the latter category
since it contains no reference to God and only affects the relationship between the parties. Id.
Therefore, according to the rabbis' testimony, the get procedure is a civil rather than religious
matter. Id.
209. Id.
210. See Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 138 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817
(1983) (using the neutral principles of law approach to permit judicial resolution of religious
disputes to the extent that it can be accomplished without consideration of doctrinal matters).
211. Id.
212. BREITOwrrz, supra note 13, at 81. The reason that the Goldman court looked to the
actual wording of the ketubah is that the ketubah signed by the Goldmans and Minkins did not
contain the beth din clause found in the Avitzur ketubah. Id.
213. In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (I11. App. Ct. 1990).
214. See Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d at 138 (finding that the signing of the ketubah, with its provisions
which resemble an antenuptial agreement, is valid and enforceable as a contractual obligation to
refer the matter to a nonjudicial forum).
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the husband to give his wife a get upon divorce. 215 Goldman is the
only recorded Illinois case in this area of the law.
In Goldman, the parties signed a ketubah prior to their wedding
ceremony, which contained a provision stating: "[be thou my wife
according to the law of Moses and Israel. '216 Unlike the ketubah in
Avitzur, the Goldmans' ketubah did not contain the provision which
requires the parties to appear before a beth din.217 The court nonethe-
less found that the get requirement could be enforced by adhering to
contract law.218 Interpreting the relevant provision, the court held
that the ketubah was intended to be a contract which required that the
"status and validity of the marriage would be governed by Orthodox
Jewish law."' 219 Two Orthodox rabbis testified that termination of a
marriage under Orthodox Jewish law requires the giving of a get.220 In
this way, the court inferred the get provision from the traditional
ketubah.
The court rejected the husband's contention that the ketubah is not
a contract, but was rather more like "poetry or art."' 221 Instead, the
court found that the ketubah is a contract with sufficiently certain
terms, and that the parties did manifest an intention that it would be
binding upon their marriage based upon the parties' request for an
Orthodox Jewish ketubah prior to their marriage, and on the parties'
conscious calculations that the ketubah would bind their marriage to
the tenets of Orthodox Jewish law.222
Finally, the court found that compelling the husband to secure a get
for his wife would not violate his First Amendment rights.223 Apply-
ing the Lemon test,224 the court concluded that an order compelling
the husband to obtain a get would not violate the Establishment
215. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1020-22 (concluding that the ketubah is an agreement be-
tween the parties that their marriage would be governed by Orthodox Jewish law which requires
the delivery of a get upon dissolution of the marriage).
216. Id. at 1020.
217. Id.
218. See id. at 1022 (finding that because the terms of the ketubah were certain and definite,
specific performance was appropriate).
219. Id.
220. See id. at 1020-1022 (finding that the expert testimony presented to the trial court estab-
lished that Orthodox Jewish law requires the delivery of the get upon dissolution of the
marriage).
221. Id. at 1021.
222. Id. at 1018-20.
223. Id. at 1022-24.
224. See Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (creating the following test to deter-
mine whether a state statute violates the Establishment Clause: (1) whether the statute goes
beyond a secular purpose; (2) whether its effect inhibits or advances religion; and (3) whether
the statute creates an entanglement between government and religion).
1996]
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Clause.225 Next, the court, using the guidelines set out in Yoder, held
that the order satisfied the requirements of the Free Exercise
Clause.226 Furthermore, the appellate court found that the lower
court's order required the husband to do nothing more than what he
had promised when he signed the ketubah.227 Because the expert tes-
timony by rabbis established that the get procedure is secular in nature
and does not require the husband to engage in any act of worship or
to express any religious belief, the court was satisfied that compelling
the husband to obtain a get would not violate his First Amendment
rights.228
The dissenting opinion disagreed that a civil court has the authority
to compel a party to perform terms of the ketubah.229 In dissent, Jus-
tice Johnson stated that the court's order violated the husband's con-
stitutional rights under the First Amendment.230 He argued that
"[a]ny order of the court which requires extensive investigation and
evaluation of religious doctrines and tenets is prohibited by the First
225. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. First, the order had the secular purpose of enforcing a
contract between the parties. Id. Two additional secular purposes were to promote a settlement
of disputes between the parties to a marriage, and to mitigate potential harm to the spouses and
their children caused by the process of a legal dissolution of marriage. Id. Second, the primary
effect of the court order was to further the secular purposes stated above rather than to advance
or inhibit religion. Id. The court based its finding on the testimonies of two expert witnesses to
the effect that Jewish law contains both religious rules and secular laws, and that marriage and
divorce are secular, contractual undertakings. Id. To the extent that the order advances Ortho-
dox Judaism, it is an incidental effect of the enforcement of the parties' contract. Id. Third, the
order avoids excessive entanglement with religion since it was applying "objective, well-estab-
lished principles of contract law which do not entail a consideration of doctrinal matters." Id.,
see also Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1979) (holding that the application of "neutral
principles of law" does not constitute excessive entanglement); Lemon, 403 U.S. at 612-13 (hold-
ing that state payments to parochial schools violated the First Amendment because such pay-
ments created an excessive entanglement between government and religion).
226. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972). The Goldman court found that the
husband's dislike or disrespect for Orthodox Judaism did not rise to the level of a true religious
belief. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. According to Yoder, only religious, as opposed to per-
sonal or philosophical, beliefs are protected by the Free Exercise Clause. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215.
See supra note 112 (discussing the definition of a "sincere" religious belief).
227. Id. at 1024; see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert. denied,
464 U.S. 817 (1983) (holding that the husband only had to appear before the designated tribunal
and accept the decision on the matter of dissolution as agreed upon by the parties when they
signed the ketubah).
228. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1024.
229. Id. at 1025 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent claimed that while the trial court had
the authority to make a ruling on the contract issue, the court could not compel the husband to
perform a provision within the contract which requires interpretation of a religious doctrine. Id.
at 1026 (Johnson, J., dissenting). The dissent further claimed that the terms of the ketubah were
not "so definite and certain as to allow the court to require specific performance of the inferred
get provision." Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
230. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
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Amendment."'231 The dissent concluded that since a civil court does
not have the authority to dictate one's religion or the form in which it
is practiced, the court order was unconstitutional. 232 Since the dissent-
ing opinion neglected prior Supreme Court rulings discussed herein,
this Comment contends that the dissent lacks the merit of the majority
opinion.
II. ANALYSIS
After thoroughly analyzing the various approaches of civil courts in
solving the domestic problems caused by the Jewish divorce proce-
dure, this Comment concludes that "specific performance" of the get
provision is constitutional because it does not violate the Establish-
ment Clause or the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.
Furthermore, enforcement of the get requirement advances several
compelling state interests. However, courts should refrain from inter-
preting the ketubah as a contract since it fails to conform materially
with contract law. Instead, courts would be wise to follow the dictates
of the Fourteenth Amendment in accommodating what may be
termed "a religious mandate."
A. Constitutional Analysis
Enforcement of the get procedure, which requires a husband to pro-
cure a get for his wife, or conversely, forcing a wife to accept her hus-
band's get, does not violate the First Amendment because
enforcement of the get procedure satisfies both the Lemon and Sher-
bert tests set forth by the Supreme Court. Moreover, requiring a hus-
band to give a get advances several compelling state interests
including equal protection and the fundamental right to remarry.
1. Get Cases Do Not Violate the Establishment Clause
Civil enforcement of the get procedure does not violate the Estab-
lishment Clause since enforcement satisfies all three prongs of the
Lemon test. In the get cases, courts have recognized several secular
purposes for compelling the husband to obtain a get.233 First, a
231. Id. at 1026 (Johnson, J., dissenting).
232. Id. (Johnson, J., dissenting).
233. For examples of the secular purposes cited by the Goldman court which support an order
compelling a Jewish husband to give his wife a get, see infra notes 234-45 and accompanying text.
The Supreme Court has noted that the Establishment Clause is violated only where there is
clearly no secular purpose for the state action. See, e.g., Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680
(1984) ("The Court has invalidated legislation or governmental action on the ground that a secu-
lar purpose was lacking, but only when it has concluded that there was no question that the
statute or activity was motivated wholly by religious considerations.").
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number of courts have recognized the secular interest of enforcing
contracts.2 34 The Goldman court held that the right to contract is a
fundamental right recognized by both federal and state constitutions,
and that states have a compelling interest in enforcing contractual
obligations.2 35
Second, in Goldman, the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Mar-
riage Act was identified as a secular interest supporting enforcement
of the get requirement.2 36 The Illinois Act seeks "amicable settle-
ment[s] of disputes that have arisen between parties to a marriage"
and to lessen any harm which the divorce process may cause to the
separating spouses and their children.2 37 The Goldman court stated
that to leave the get issue unresolved by not enforcing the husband's
obligation to release his wife from the marriage "would have a nega-
tive effect on both the spouses and their children. '238
Third, there is the secular interest of complete severance of the
marriage in order to allow for remarriage. 239 Several courts, including
the Goldman court, have taken notice of the fact that without a valid
get release, the wife would be forever bound to the husband to the
extent that she can never remarry within her faith.240 The Goldman
court relied on Minkin, which stated that an order compelling the hus-
band to secure a get has "the clear secular purpose of completing a
dissolution of the marriage,"241 in finding that the most effective way
to guarantee the wife's fundamental right to remarry and have chil-
234. The get cases recognizing the state's compelling interest in enforcing contracts are In re
Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990); Bums v. Bums. 538 A.2d 438 (N.J.
Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981); and Avitzur v.
Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 139 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983).
235. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023.
236. Id.
237. Id. (citing 750 ILCS 5/102 (West 1995)).
238. Id. The court duly noted that without a get, the wife is prohibited by her religious beliefs
from remarrying. Id.
239. See, e.g., N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKinney Supp. 1983). Further, if the right to
remarry is viewed as a constitutionally protected right, this secular state interest becomes suffi-
ciently compelling to override any First Amendment challenges. See, e.g., Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398 (1963) (finding that a burden imposed on an individual's free exercise of religion is
valid if it is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest).
240. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (III. App. Ct. 1990) (noting that a wife
who does not receive a get from her husband is precluded from remarrying according to Jewish
law); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1981) (ordering specific enforcement of a
get on the rationale that without compliance with the contract, the wife could not remarry in
accordance with her religious beliefs); Rubin v. Rubin, 348 N.Y.S.2d 61 (N.Y. Farn. Ct. 1973)
(describing the get as an act of release freeing the wife so she may remarry).
241. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023 (quoting Minkin, 434 A.2d at 667).
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dren is by forcing the husband to give her a get upon the civil dissolu-
tion of the parties' marriage.2 42
The primary effect of the cases requiring the husband to secure a get
is to effectuate the secular purposes behind the order: to enforce a
contract, to promote family harmony and to permit the wife to re-
marry.243 As the Goldman court held, "the primary effect of the court
order was to further the secular purposes ... and not to advance or
inhibit religion."' 244 That the order also touched upon a religious issue
should not invalidate the court order altogether. This is especially
true since the Supreme Court has held that even if a given state action
incidentally infringes upon the freedom of religion, the Establishment
Clause is violated only where there clearly is no secular purpose for
the state action or where the action is motivated "wholly by religious
considerations. 245
In reaching its conclusion, the Goldman court, like the Minkin and
Avitzur courts, relied upon the abundant evidence which confirmed
that the giving of a get is a secular act creating a contractual release
that is effected by the parties themselves.246 The court was convinced
by the expert testimony that "[i]t does not involve worship or an ex-
pression of faith; the procedure contains no divine reference; no one
says any blessing or states any professions of faith or credos; and the
husband and wife do not, and are not required to subscribe to any
particular set of beliefs." 247 The court found that although many rules
and details are associated with the get procedure, "this alone does not
242. See infra notes 294-98 and accompanying text (analyzing the get procedure in light of the
Fourteenth Amendment right to remarry).
243. See supra notes 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing the fundamental right to
remarry).
244. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. Similarly, the Minkin court concluded that the primary
effect of requiring husbands to give a get "neither advances nor inhibits religion since it does not
require the husband to participate in a religious ceremony or to do acts contrary to his religious
beliefs." Minkin, 434 A.2d at 668.
245. Lynch v. Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 680 (1984). Further, the Lynch court noted that the
First Amendment "affirmatively mandates accommodation, not merely tolerance, of all reli-
gions." Id. at 673. This requires a policy of neutrality in applying general principles to the prac-
tices of a religious group even though it may "operate[ ] to afford an indirect" benefit to a
religion. Walz v. Tax Comm'n of N.Y. City, 397 U.S. 664, 674 (1970).
246. See supra notes 215-28 and accompanying text (discussing the Goldman court's treatment
of the get requirement). The Goldman court made special note of the ample expert testimony
that "Judaism contains both secular and religious laws and ... the get procedure [is] secular in
nature." Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023. The Avitzur court held that the relief "sought by the
plaintiff in this action is simply to compel defendant to perform a secular obligation to which he
contractually bound himself." 446 N.E.2d 136 (N.Y. App. Ct. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 817
(1983).
247. Brief for Appellee at 42, In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (I11. App. Ct. 1990)
(No. 89-1025).
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transform the procedure into a religious act." 248 Thus, the primary
effect of the courts' orders in the get cases was to enforce the consen-
sual terms of the agreement and to sever the relationship in accord-
ance with Jewish law.
Finally, the Goldman court held that its order requiring the hus-
band to obtain the get does not foster an excessive entanglement with
religion.249 First, the court's inquiry was not itself a prohibited entan-
glement since it is well established that a court "may apply objective,
well-established principles of secular law, or 'neutral principles of
law,' which do not entail a consideration of doctrinal matters. '250 The
Goldman court only interpreted the procedures and requirements of
the get, and the evidence clearly showed that these procedures and
requirements could be interpreted by purely secular means. 25'
It is a well-settled principle that courts may look to and apply reli-
gious doctrine as long as they defer to the interpretation given by the
religious authority and do not attempt to resolve any dispute within
the church about religious doctrine.25 2 In Goldman, Avitzur, and
Minkin, the courts recognized as evidence expert testimony as to the
248. Id.
249. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023 (basing its holding on the fact that the order "ha[d] the
secular purpose of enforcing a contract between the parties").
250. Id. (citing Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602-03 (1976)). See supra notes 101-06 and accom-
panying text (discussing the prohibition against excessive entanglement under the Establishment
Clause).
251. See supra note 228 and accompanying text (discussing the rabbis' testimony that procur-
ing a get has only secular purposes).
252. From the "church property" cases, it would appear at first glance that if there is a dispute
within Judaism as to the obligations imposed by the ketubah, a court would be prohibited by the
Establishment Clause from resolving the dispute. See, e.g., Jones v. Wolf, 443 U.S. 595, 602
(1976) (holding that state courts must examine religious documents in a strictly secular manner);
see also Serbian Eastern Orthodox Diocese for the United States v. Milivojevich, 426 U.S. 696,
724-25 (1976) (holding that the First Amendment requires that civil courts defer to resolution of
issues of religious doctrine by the highest court of the hierarchical church organization); Aglikim
v. Kovachef, 516 N.E.2d 706 (11. App. Ct. 1987) (adopting the neutral principles analysis and
noting that deference must be given on doctrinal issues). However, the get cases may be distin-
guished from the church property cases in two significant ways: (1) the requirement of the get is
uncontested so the court is not resolving a dispute as to interpretation and (2) the get procedure
is not religious by nature. Thus, enforcement of the get proceeding is not violative of the Estab-
lishment Clause. See Warmflash, supra note 93, at 242 (referring to the proposition that Jewish
law is divisible into two parts: one strictly religious, because it concerns the relations between
man and God, and the other essentially secular since it controls the relations between man and
man). There is authority for the proposition that Jewish law regarding marriage and divorce is
not considered religious within the meaning of the First Amendment since it affects only the
relationship between a husband and wife and makes no reference to God. Bleich, supra note 25,
at 202 (arguing that the get procedure is not at all religious because there is no confession of faith
or worship).
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nature of the get proceeding.253 Remaining clearly within the parame-
ters of the law, the courts made only a cursory examination of Jewish
law, accepting the rabbis' interpretation as to the meaning of the reli-
gious doctrine delineating the get procedure. In so acting, these courts
did not attempt to resolve a religious dispute. Rather they merely
applied the law as interpreted by the religious authorities in reaching
their conclusions.254 As the court in County of Allegheny v. ACLP55
stated: "[a] prescription of ignorance obviously would bias [the court]
according to the religious and cultural backgrounds of its members, a
condition much more intolerable than any which results from the
[c]ourt's efforts to become familiar with the relevant facts. ' 256 Ac-
cordingly, if the Goldman court, as well as the others preceding it, had
precluded evidence of the get procedure on the grounds that to do so
would constitute excessive entanglement with religion, the courts
would not have discovered the get's secular nature and most certainly
would not have ordered the husband to give his wife the get, a policy
which effectuates a number of secular and compelling interests. Thus,
civil enforcement of the get procedure is not only sound policy, it is
clearly within the bounds of the law.
Using the guidelines set forth in Lemon v. Kurtzman, courts have
determined that civil enforcement of the get proceeding avoids violat-
ing the Establishment Clause.257 First, enforcement advances several
clear and convincing secular purposes; second, enforcement does not
advance nor inhibit religion since, according to the proper authorities,
the giving of a get does not constitute a religious act at all; and third,
enforcement does not involve the courts in excessive entanglement
with religion because the courts, by relying exclusively on the inter-
253. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1022; Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667-68 (N.J. Super. Ct.
1981). The court is not interpreting Jewish law or resolving disputes over conflicting interpreta-
tion since it is uncontested that Orthodox Jewish law requires the giving of a get in order to
dissolve a Jewish marriage; see also Avitzur v. Avitzur, 446 N.E.2d 136, 136 (N.Y. App. Ct.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 817 (1983) (accepting the lower court's finding that the husband's giving of the
get accomplished a Jewish divorce and refraining from making a determination as to the religious
nature of the proceeding).
254. The Goldman, Minkin and Avitzur courts merely used Jewish law as a reference in
resolving the issue of marital dissolution. This level of judicial involvement has been deemed
appropriate to avoid entanglement with religion. See supra note 102 and accompanying text
(discussing Schwartzman and the importance of examining "undisputed points of religious doc-
trine" when analyzing religious matters). See also Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 208-13
(1972) (taking notice of Amish religious doctrine and relying on expert opinion in reaching its
conclusions).
255. 492 U.S. 573 (1989).
256. Id. at 614 n.60.
257. See supra notes 98-100 and accompanying text (discussing the Lemon test).
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pretation of religious authority, remain well within the legal bounda-
ries previously set out by the Supreme Court.
2. Get Cases Do Not Violate the Free Exercise Clause
One commentator has asserted that the get cases "are more likely to
run afoul of the Establishment Clause than of the Free Exercise
Clause. ' 25 8 However, there is a potential free exercise problem which
must be overcome as well. Since the Free Exercise Clause prohibits
governmental interference with both an individual's practice of and
refusal to practice religion,259 it may be argued that a court order com-
pelling a husband to obtain a get may be treading on the husband's
right to free exercise of religion.260
The free exercise claim may be overcome by the accepted proposi-
tion that since the husband is not being compelled to practice his reli-
gion nor to profess his faith in God, the get procedure is not religious
in nature.261 As such, neither mandatory appearance before a beth
din nor the act of giving a get constitutes a burden on the husband's
free exercise of religion. Arguably, since the get proceeding is not
religious in nature, the husband's free exercise rights are not actually
violated. However, any perceived incidental burden civil enforcement
of the get procedure imposes on such rights have been deemed to be
overridden by a number of compelling state interests. 262
Since, in many instances, the husband's refusal to grant the get is
not based on sincere religious beliefs at all, no valid free exercise
claim is even invoked.263 For example, in Goldman, the court found
that the husband never clearly stated how an adverse ruling would
258. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 242.
259. Marshall, supra note 44, at 224.
260. But see Warmflash, supra note 93, at 242 (arguing that although this proposition is tena-
ble, it has been substantially refuted "because a decree of specific performance would merely
require the defendant to do what he voluntarily agreed to do" upon signing the ketubah).
261. See supra notes 107-10 and accompanying text (discussing the two components of Jewish
law and noting that Jewish and legal scholars place the get procedure in the secular category).
262. Marshall, supra note 44, at 233. Possible state interests which may justify compelling
individuals to procure a religious divorce are (1) allowing divorced spouses to remarry freely, (2)
eliminating opportunities of extortion or the intentional infliction of emotional suffering, and (3)
the protection of the welfare of any children involved. Id. Marshall also found the enforcement
of contractual obligations to be a compelling state interest, a proposition which this Comment
refuses to espouse for reasons set forth infra notes 276-91 and accompanying text.
263. See In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016,1023 (I1. App. Ct. 1990) (discussing the
court's finding that the husband's "dislike" for Orthodox Judaism did not rise to the level of a
religious belief and thus, his claim was not grounded in the First Amendment); see also Wiscon-
sin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972) (holding that personal or philosophical beliefs are not
protected by the Free Exercise Clause).
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affect the exercise of his religion.264 He never articulated to his wife
that he had any religious objections to giving the get.2 65 Instead, the
court found that while the husband may have "abhorred the practices
of Orthodox Jews, whom he characterized as discriminatory, repulsive
and 'antimodern,'" he never actually attacked their religious be-
liefs. 266 The court therefore found that the husband's free exercise
claim failed to reach the minimum level required by the First
Amendment. 67
The Supreme Court has held that "purely secular views" are not
afforded constitutional protection and that states are "clearly entitled
to assure themselves that there is an ample predicate for invoking the
Free Exercise Clause [by] distinguishing between religious and secular
convictions and in determining whether a professed belief is sincerely
held. ' 268 Consequently, the Goldman court found that the husband's
professed hatred of Orthodox Jews combined with his efforts to "pun-
ish and extort" did not qualify for constitutional protection.2 69
Further, courts may assume that the husband's participation in the
Jewish wedding ceremony implies his agreement to conform to Jewish
law until such time that a dissolution of the marriage occurs in accord-
ance with Jewish law. In Goldman, one rabbi expert witness testified
that there is "simply no doctrine in any branch of Judaism that says a
husband ought not give his wife a get if they are divorced and she
wants one in accordance with Orthodox procedure. T270
264. See Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023 (finding that the trial court had simply applied princi-
ples of contract law to enforce the agreement and the terms of the order were limited to avoid
any interference with religious doctrine).
265. Id. at 1019. In fact, the court-appointed attorney for the couple's children testified that
the husband told her that he "would not be adverse to giving his wife a Jewish divorce" if he got
his custody terms. Id. at 1020. The husband never denied having made these comments. Id.
266. Id. at 1023.
267. Id. The Free Exercise Clause requires that an action actually violate or conflict with a
sincerely held religious belief. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 215-16 (holding that the state must actually
deny an individual's free exercise of religion by its requirements). The Goldman court also duly
noted that the husband had given his first a wife a get and that there was testimonial evidence
that he was withholding the get as a bargaining tool in the ensuing custody dispute. 554 N.E.2d
at 1023-24.
268. Frazee v. Illinois Dept. of Empl. Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832 (1989).
269. Goldman, 554 N.E.2d at 1023-24. Similarly, the Yoder court stated that
to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be rooted in religious
belief. Although a determination of what is a "religious" belief or practice entitled to
constitutional protection may present a most delicate question, the very concept of or-
dered liberty precludes allowing every person to make his own standards on matters of
conduct in which society as a whole has important interests.
406 U.S. at 215-16; see also Thomas v. Review Bd. of the Ind. Empl. Sec. Div., 450 U.S. 707, 713
(1981) ("Only beliefs rooted in religion are protected by the Free Exercise Clause...").
270. Brief for Appellee at 21, In re Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016 (Il1. App. Ct. 1990)
(No. 89-1025).
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One commentator has stated that compelled religious divorces
"bring into focus the inherent conflict in the Free Exercise Clause."' 271
This refers to the dilemma resulting from the court's obligation to
choose to protect one party's free exercise rights at the expense of the
other party's rights. The Free Exercise Clause mandates that the
wife's religious beliefs, which require her to obtain a get before she
may remarry, be accommodated by requiring the husband to cooper-
ate in securing the get. According to the wife's religious beliefs, the
get is the only way to effectuate the divorce and allow her the freedom
to remarry. However, the Free Exercise Clause supposedly also pro-
tects the husband's right to refuse to participate in the ritual if the
court is convinced that the act is religious in nature.2 72
While it may be argued that the court is burdening the husband's
right to free exercise in protecting that of the wife, this Comment pro-
vides an alternative explanation. Accepting the -theory that the get
procedure is not religious in nature, this Comment contends that
courts are not forcing the husband to participate in a religious practice
against his will. Also, numerous cases illustrate the Supreme Court's
policy of accommodation.273 Accordingly, a court order which accom-
modates the wife's free exercise of religious beliefs by granting her a
get not only fails to interfere with the husband's free exercise rights,
but is firmly grounded in legal history.274
Protecting the wife's free exercise rights also advances a number of
compelling state interests, none of which would be served if the court
favored the husband's free exercise claim. 275 Further, protection of
these interests greatly outweighs any minor burden incidentally im-
posed on the husband's free exercise rights.
B. Compelling State Interest Analysis
This Comment contends that the ketubah should not be enforced as
a binding contract for the various reasons discussed below. Instead of
looking to the freedom to contract as the compelling state interest on
271. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 252.
272. But see Lewin, supra note 193, at 2 (suggesting that a husband's decision not to practice
his religion should not be protected under the Free Exercise Clause when that decision impacts
and interferes with his wife's decision to practice her religion).
273. See supra notes 92-96, 111 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's policy
of accommodation).
274. See supra notes 111-26 and accompanying text (discussing the Free Exercise Clause).
275. See supra notes 236-43 and accompanying text (discussing several compelling state inter-
ests which the Goldman court recognized as being served by enforcing the get procedure). See
also infra notes 292-96 and accompanying text (discussing the compelling state interests pro-
posed by this Comment).
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which to base a court order enforcing the get proceeding, this Com-
ment proposes that enforcement of the get proceeding advances the
compelling state interests of ensuring equal application of the law to
both parties involved and protecting the fundamental right to
remarry.
1. Contractual Analysis
There are numerous reasons for asserting that the ketubah is not
analogous to other antenuptial agreements. 276 Disregarding the fact
that most antenuptial agreements are freely negotiated at arms length
and are written in a language both parties understand, the primary
problem lies with the parties' intent at the time of "contracting. '27 7
Courts have recognized that in some situations, there is a presumption
that no legal obligations will arise from the transaction, and so an unu-
sual manifestation of intention is necessary to actually create a bind-
ing contract.278 Courts have recognized that there exist a few
situations in which the typical intent is not to create an enforceable
contract, such as in social, intra-family, and arguably, religious set-
tings.279 Since the marital setting fits into these categories, the pre-
sumption that the parties did not intend the religious Hebrew
document to be binding holds true.
While the most prominent reason to disregard the ketubah as a
binding legal contract is the parties' lack of intention to be bound,
there are numerous other reasons why the ketubah fails to stand up to
standard contract requirements. First, most often the ketubah signifies
nothing more than adherence to a religious tradition.280 Commenta-
276. In other areas as well, the ketubah has not been upheld as a contract that gives the parties
recognizable legal rights. See, e.g., In re Estate of White, 356 N.Y.S.2d 208 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1974)
(holding that a ketubah did not give a widow any inheritance rights because the ketubah had no
binding effect on the property rights of signers).
277. See supra note 143-46 (noting Kahan's and Marshall's denial that the parties intend to be
contractually bound to the terms of the ketubah upon their signing thereof).
278. See, eg., Balfour v. Balfour, 2 K.B. 571 (1919) (holding that interspousal agreements
generally are not viewed as "contracts"); see also I CoP.ant ON CoNTRcrs § 34 (1963) ("If the
subject matter and terms are not such as customarily have affected legal relations, the transac-
tion is not legally operative unless the expressions of the party indicate an intention to make it
so."). Cf. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrs § 21 (1981) ("Neither real nor apparent in-
tention that a promise be legally binding is essential to the formation of a contract, but a mani-
festation of intention that a promise shall not affect legal relations may prevent the formation of
a contract."). These authorities illustrate that different guidelines exist for marital and
nonmarital situations.
279. Marshall, supra note 44, at 224 n.97; see, e.g., Mitzel v. Hauck, 105 N.W.2d 378 (1960)
(holding that social agreements among friends are not binding).
280. See supra notes 144-45 and accompanying text (discussing the significance of the
ketubah).
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tors have argued that the ketubah does not necessarily reflect a
"knowing intention to assume certain obligations, including that to ar-
bitrate marital problems before a beth din or to procure a get upon
divorce."'281 A problem also arises in enforcing outmoded terms of
the ketubah, such as the promise to pay the monetary sum of 200
zuzim282 in the event of a divorce or the husband's death.283
Furthermore, the fact that the ketubah is usually an elaborately dec-
orated document, similar to an "illuminated manuscript," merely en-
hances the impression that the ketubah is more of a religious symbol
than a legal document. 284 In sum, the ketubah has been labeled as "no
more than a set of 'boilerplate' clauses which cannot be assumed to
capture the expectations and intentions of the parties. '285
Finally, courts need not construe the ketubah as a binding contract
in order to require the husband to perform his "contractual" obliga-
tion of securing the get.286 Not only is the get requirement absent
from some ketuboth,287 it is not historically rooted in the ketubah doc-
ument at all.288 The get requirement originated in the Bible, and is
281. Kahan, supra note 19, at 216-17. While the couple may associate the signing of the
ketubah with the notion that they "are really being married in accordance with Jewish law, it is
unlikely that their signatures manifest a knowing assent to the specific obligations enumerated in
the ketubah." Id. Indeed, usually no one even offers to explain that a clause included in the
ketubah can require an appearance before a beth din in order to facilitate the dissolution of the
marriage. Id.
282. Zuzim is plural for zuz. A zuz was a small silver coin used in Palestine and Babylonia
during the Talmudic period. BaErrowrrz, supra note 13, at 284 n.4. How 200 zuzim translates
into dollars is uncertain. To determine an approximate dollar amount, the going market rate of
the metallic content of the ancient zuz coin is quantified. Id. at 288. Since the zuz was a silver
coin that contained approximately .2 ounces of pure silver, and 200 of those equals forty ounces
of silver, depending on the current market value of silver, the alimony payment should be ap-
proximately $320 - hardly a significant sum in this day and age. Id. at 288-89. In terms of
alimony, therefore, since the ketubah provides for only minimal recovery, it is usually not re-
garded as sufficient protection and its enforcement is rarely sought. Id.
283. See supra note 24 (providing a translation of the ketubah).
284. See Kahan, supra note 19, at 216 (concluding that the ketubah has no more than religious
significance); see also E. DoPRli & A. ROssET-r, A LiviNo TREE: MATERIALS ON THE JEWISH
LEGAL TADrTON WITH COMPARATIVE NOTES XIII-12 (3d prelim. ed. 1983) (unpublished
manuscript).
285. Kahan, supra note 19, at 216.
286. Rabbis view the Jewish legal requirement of obtaining the get as contractual. See In re
Marriage of Goldman, 554 N.E.2d 1016, 1022 (I11. App. Ct. 1990) (noting that the ketubah re-
quires the marriage to be governed by Jewish law, which mandates the giving of a get upon
divorce); Minkin v. Minkin, 434 A.2d 665, 667 (N.J. Sup. Ct. 1981) (concluding that the ketubah
provides that the parties agree to abide by Jewish law in matters regarding their marriage, and
that Jewish law requires a husband to give his wife a get to terminate the marriage).
287. Plural for ketubah.
288. See supra note 44 and accompanying text (noting that the get requirement originated in
the Torah).
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therefore a Biblical mandate rather than a contractual provision.289 In
fact, a number of courts have held the get obligation to be binding on
the husband as a matter of Jewish law regardless of whether the
ketubah is considered a contract.29° Since courts are able to enforce
the get ritual based on a policy of accommodation, legal straining to fit
the ketubah into the mold of a binding contract is simply
unnecessary.291
2. Fourteenth Amendment Analysis
States have a compelling interest in ensuring that all parties are af-
forded equal protection under the law as a constitutional guarantee.292
By definition, this right must also be guaranteed in the case of reli-
gious divorces. However, under Jewish law, a husband may refuse to
grant his wife a get and effectively prevent her from ever again remar-
rying within the Jewish faith while he is free to do so without being
faced with the same dire consequences. 293
By the very nature of this situation, then, the law is applied un-
equally if courts permit such a practice. To cure this inequity, the
court may, as many already have, fashion a legal remedy and enforce
the get provision of the ketubah to ensure equal application of the law.
Not only does the court have the authority to do so, it has the moral
obligation to the woman whose fundamental rights are being jeopard-
ized by an antiquated rule.
Since remarriage has been deemed to be a fundamental right,294
and public policy favors remarriage,295 the state has a compelling in-
289. The Bible states that when a man divorces a woman "he writes her a bill of divorce, and
gives it in her hand." Deuteronomy 24:104.
290. These courts have held that even without a ketubah, a court may use its equity powers to
order a husband to give a get to protect the wife's civil liberties. See Burns v. Burns, 538 A.2d
438 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987) (holding that since the husband's refusal to grant a get was
not based on genuine religious beliefs, the court order compelling him to submit to jurisdiction
of the beth din to initiate the procedure to secure the get would not violate the Establishment
Clause). But see brner v. Turner, 192 So. 2d 787, cert. denied, 201 So. 2d 233 (Fla. 1966) (hold-
ing the get provision in the ketubah to be unenforceable by a civil court).
291. See supra notes 92-96, 111 and accompanying text (discussing the Supreme Court's policy
of accommodation).
292. See supra notes 147-50 and accompanying text (discussing the Equal Protection Clause).
293. See supra notes 63-83 and accompanying text (discussing the husband's leverage over his
wife in divorce proceedings and the differing religious consequences of remarriage for husbands
and wives without a get).
294. See supra note 164-74 and accompanying text (discussing remarriage as a fundamental
right).
295. See supra notes 171-73, 190-95 and accompanying text (discussing state statutes which
have been enacted in order to foster "amicable" dissolutions and remove obstacles to
remarriage).
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terest in aiding a wife in obtaining a get when her religious adherence
to the tenets of Orthodox Judaism prevents her from remarrying with-
out one.296 Absent state intervention on the wife's behalf, there is the
potential risk that a husband will abuse his unilateral power to grant
the get.297 Clearly, such a practice is contrary to public policy, and
state intervention in this situation is necessary to protect the wife's
fundamental civil rights.298
Jewish law unfortunately provides different consequences for re-
marriage on the basis of sex. The Equal Protection doctrine, however,
provides the remedy to cure the inherent inequity imposed by Jewish
law. The fundamental right in need of preservation in this case is that
the wife be given the same opportunity as her husband to remarry. In
sum, the state's compelling interest that all parties be treated equally
under the law as well as that of protecting parties' fundamental civil
rights requires courts to enforce the get proceeding upon civil dissolu-
tion of a marriage. Unlike prior court decisions, enforcement need
not, and in fact should not, be grounded in contract law.
III. CONCLUSION
When a Jewish couple signs a ketubah on their wedding day, they
implicitly agree that their marriage will be governed by Jewish law in
addition to the civil law of the state of their marriage. Although the
vast majority of couples do not understand the content of the ketubah,
they fathom the symbolic significance of their signatures upon the
document. Jewish law is deemed to guide their marriage throughout
their lifetimes or until the misfortune of divorce arises. Accordingly,
both parties implicitly agree to comply with the religious divorce pro-
ceeding in order to dissolve their marriage under Jewish law and en-
able them both to remarry within the faith.
This Comment has fervently argued that civil enforcement of the get
proceeding in divorce cases is proper, although it is improper to up-
hold the ketubah as a legally binding contract. Notwithstanding that
the get proceeding is articulated in the modern adaptation of the Con-
servative ketubah, the original requirement of the get upon marital
296. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 249.
297. Alternatively, the husband may condition his granting of the get on diminished alimony,
maintenance, or support payments, thus employing the get as a bargaining chip. See supra note
66 and accompanying text (noting that many husbands use their "get power" as extreme leverage
over their wives to extort favorable settlements or just to keep their wives bound to the marriage
against their will).
298. The New York get statute recognized the state's interest in fostering a public policy that
favors remarriage. Warmflash, supra note 93, at 250 (citing N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 253 (McKin-
ney Supp. 1983)).
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dissolution is found in the Torah, and is therefore not a contractually-
based requirement. Rather, the act of giving and receiving a get is a
command which finds its origin in the oldest work of literature and
which has been fortified by an enduring and unique culture and legal
tradition. That courts should find ways not to enforce such a mandate
would be a great travesty of justice.
This Comment has presented a sound legal argument explaining
that civil enforcement of the get procedure does not violate the First
Amendment of the Constitution. Neither the Establishment Clause
nor the Free Exercise Clause is breached by a court order requiring a
husband to give his wife a get in accordance with Jewish law. This
Comment has further shown that enforcement serves to protect vital
constitutional rights of the wife. By forcing a husband to grant his
wife a get upon civil dissolution of their marriage, the court is ensuring
equal application of the law by remedying an inherently discrimina-
tory situation, and enabling both parties to freely remarry on equal
footing.
As this Comment has shown, even in the face of a religious issue,
civil courts have the power to effectuate a just result. As such, it is
clearly within the scope of the courts' authority to remove the chains
of the "bound woman."
Jodi M. Solovy
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